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With the rapid evolution of information and communication technologies, more com-
plicated network architectures and more advanced network topologies and access tech-
niques are exploited to support the unprecedented growth of data traffic in the 5G
communication. This fact, therefore, leads to an enormous amount of sensitive and
confidential information transmitted via the wireless channels, e.g., financial data,
medical records, and customer files. How to guarantee information security has at-
tracted increasing concerns from both academia and industry recently. Physical layer
(PHY) security has been proposed as one promising technology to provide security
guarantee for wireless communications, owing to its unique advantages over tradi-
tional cryptography-based mechanisms, like an everlasting security guarantee and no
need for costly secret key distribution/management and complex encryption algo-
rithms. This thesis, therefore, focuses on the design of communication protocols with
PHY security techniques to secure a buffer-aided relaying system, where relay buffers
are adopted to help the transmission of information.
We first investigate the secure communication in a two-hop cooperative wireless
network, where a buffer-aided relay helps forward data from the source to destina-
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tion, and a passive eavesdropper attempts to intercept data transmission from both
the source and relay. To ensure the transmission security and communication qual-
ity of service (QoS) of the system, we design the novel communication protocols for
two cases that the instantaneous channel state information is available or unavailable
at the source node. For the evaluation of system performance, we then derive the
closed-form expressions of end-to-end secrecy outage probability, system throughput
and secrecy throughput, respectively. Based on the theoretical performance analy-
sis, we further explore the performance optimization issues, revealing the insightful
tradeoffs between transmission security and QoS. An iterative algorithm is developed
to identify the optimal setting of link selection parameters, which is helpful for the
practical configuration of link selection policies to satisfy various system performance
requirements. Finally, we conduct simulations to validate our theoretical performance
analysis, and also provide extensive numerical results to illustrate the efficiency of the
proposed communication protocols for ensuring secure communication in the buffer-
aided relaying system.
We then investigate the secure communication in a wireless relaying system where
the packet lifetime is limited, multiple buffer-aided relays help the source forward
packets to the destination, and a passive eavesdropper attempts to wiretap the trans-
missions over both hops. To guarantee the end-to-end transmission security and
timeliness in the system, we design a novel security/delay-aware communication pro-
tocol that grants transmission nodes different priorities for packet delivery based on
the wireless channel state, real-time buffer state, and packet delay requirement. To
evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol, we then develop a Markov chain-
based theoretical framework to fully characterize the packet occupancy process in
the relay buffers. With the help of this framework, we further derive under two typ-
ical fading channel cases the closed-form expressions for three fundamental system
performance metrics, namely the reliable outage probability, packet discarding prob-
iv
ability and achievable secrecy throughput. Finally, we present extensive simulation
and numerical results to validate our theoretical results, as well as to demonstrate
the efficiency of the proposed protocol for ensuring secure and timely communication
in the buffer-aided relaying system. The results indicate that the proposed commu-
nication protocol can be flexibly controlled according to different lifetime constraints
to satisfy different performance requirements of the system.
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In this chapter, we first introduce the background of physical layer security and
then present the objective and main works of this thesis. Finally, we give the outline
and main notations of this thesis.
1.1 Physical Layer Security
With the rapid evolution of information and communication technologies, het-
erogeneous network architectures and access techniques are exploited to support the
unprecedented growth in data traffic in 5G communications [1]. This fact leads to
an enormous amount of sensitive and confidential information transmitted via wire-
less channels [2]. However, due to the broadcast nature of the wireless mediums,
communications over wireless networks are susceptible to eavesdropping attacks from
unauthorized users (i.e., eavesdroppers). Therefore, how to guarantee wireless com-
munication security has been attracting increasing attention from both academia and
industry recently.
Traditionally, data is secured by applying the key-based enciphering (crypto-
graphic) techniques in the upper layers of the network protocol stack [3]. Although
these cryptographic methods have shown their effectiveness in wired networks, the
inherent difficulty of secret key distribution/management without centralized control
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and the involved complex encryption algorithms may significantly limit their appli-
cations in decentralized wireless networks [4]. More importantly, all cryptographic
measures are based on the premise that it is computationally infeasible for them to
be deciphered without the secret key, which is still unproven in mathematics. How-
ever, ciphers that were considered virtually unbreakable in the past are continually
surmounted due to the potential transformative progress in computing, e.g., quan-
tum computing [5]. These motivate the introduction of physical layer (PHY) security
technology recently as the complementary approach to further enhancing the security
in wireless communications [6]. The philosophy behind PHY security is to exploit
the natural randomness of noise and the physical characteristics of wireless channels
(like fading) to provide information-theoretic security, which has been regarded as the
strongest form of security irrespective of the computing capabilities of eavesdroppers
[7–9]. Thus, PHY security techniques are highly promising to guarantee everlasting
secure communication for wireless networks [10–12].
The story of PHY security starts from Shannon’s work in 1949 [13], where the
concept of secrecy communication was investigated based on the information theory.
Subsequently, Wyner introduced the noise wiretap channel model [14], where both
links from the legitimate transmitter to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
are noisy. His result has uncovered the fact that, if the legitimate user’s observation
is better than the eavesdropper’s observation, information-theoretically secure com-
munication between the legitimate users is possible while keeping the eavesdropper
completely ignorant of the secure message without using any secret keys. Wyner’s
work established the fundamental framework for the study of PHY security. Then,
Wyner’s result was generalized to the general (i.e., not necessarily degraded) wire-
tap channel by Csiszár and Körner in [15], determining the secrecy capacity for this
general wiretap channel model. Their result has shown that even if the eavesdrop-
ping channel is not inferior to the legitimate channel, information-theoretically secure
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communication between the legitimate users can still be possible by exploiting the
inherent randomness of the wireless medium. Following this line, the research of PHY
security was conducted under various wireless channel models, such as Gaussian chan-
nel [16], multi-antenna channel [17] and relay channel [18], etc. Motivated by these
early studies, diverse approaches for improving PHY security have been proposed in
the literature, which mainly include channel beamforming [19–21], cooperative jam-
ming [22–24], channel coding [25–27] and cooperative relaying [28–48].
Beamforming is a signal processing technique used in the multiple-in-multiple-out
(MIMO) network for directional signal transmission or reception, where all nodes are
equipped with antennas and one data stream can be transmitted to the intended
receiver over multiple antennas. It enhances the information transmission security
for the wireless network in such a way that signals at particular angles experience
constructive interference while others experience destructive interference. It has been
proved in [19] that beamforming can be highly effective in improving the secrecy
rate of heterogeneous networks with orthogonal/non-orthogonal spectrum allocation
strategies by optimizing the beam-forming weights at the macrocell and femtocell.
The Beamforming application also can maximize the minimum secrecy rate among
all users and secure energy efficiency (SEE) under the energy harvesting constraints,
which are testified in [20] and [21], respectively. However, the beamformer opti-
mization heavily depends on the channel state informations (CSIs). Thus, the high
coordination requirements (such as synchronization and central optimization) among
the source and relay nodes are required, which leads to the high overhead in imple-
mentation, as a large amount of information will be exchanged between the nodes.
Cooperative jamming ensures the security of wireless networks by employing the
helper nodes to act as jammers, which generate artificial jamming signals at the
eavesdropper, such that the achievable secrecy rate between the legitimate pair can
be increased. According to the types of jamming signals, cooperative jamming can
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be classified into two categories. One is cooperative jamming with independent iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d) Gaussian signals, where the jamming signal will cause inter-
ference to both the legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper, but may result in zero
secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) [22]. Another is based on the potential necessity
of channel prefixing and adopts the structured signals, where the jamming signals
could be nulled out at the intended receiver [23]. In [24], the s.d.o.f. equal to 1/2
can be achieved using real interference alignment whenever the value of the channel
gain is any irrational number. The major difference between cooperative jamming
with Gaussian noise and that with structured signals is that, in the latter, the legiti-
mate user is able to decode the confusion signal, hence receiving a clean information-
carrying signal whereas the eavesdropper’s channel remains jammed. However, there
are still several challenges in practical implementation. First, it is difficult to realize
any dedicated helper node in the network, as nodes tend to make independent and
selfish decisions in large scale networks. Second, the legitimate nodes may only have
limited or even no CSI at the eavesdropper, especially if the eavesdropper operates in
the passive mode, which imposes great challenges to cooperative jamming since the
involved power allocation schemes usually rely on perfect channel estimation. This
issue is of more concerning for jamming nodes because power allocation schemes for
cooperative jamming usually rely on perfect channel estimation. Third, to minimize
the gap between research efforts and practical implementation of the device coop-
eration, standardization is necessary. It is considerably difficult to standardize the
friendly jamming under different network topologies, because the decision is based on
the nature of jammers to either cooperate or stay independent.
Channel coding employs a nested wiretap code structure, mapping each message
to one of several codewords at random to increase the confusion of the eavesdrop-
per. In [25], the authors showed how capacity-achieving codes can be used to achieve
the secrecy capacity for any wiretap channel and proved that it is possible to con-
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struct linear-time decodable secrecy codes based on low-density parity-check (LDPC)
codes to achieve secrecy. The authors constructed the explicit polynomial-time en-
coding/decoding algorithm, the recently polar codes invented by Arıkan [49] has been
shown to achieve the secrecy capacity for binary symmetric and deterministic wire-
tap channels in [26]. Recently, the channel coding research has been extended to
the design of resilient codes for distributed data and cloud storage systems. The
authors in [27] studied the problem of securing distributed storage systems (DSS)
against eavesdroppers and malicious adversaries, and established a bound on the se-
crecy capacity with secure cooperative regenerating codes. Although this technique
can notably achieve the high-security performance of the network, the construction of
the codebook is hard and even challenging, especially for the sophisticated network in
5G. Furthermore, similar to the majority of the above two PHY security techniques,
channel coding also requires the CSI knowledge of the eavesdropping channel.
Cooperative relaying technique aims to improve the security of wireless networks
by choosing a link/relay with a strong legitimate channel and meanwhile a weak eaves-
dropping channel. According to whether the relay is equipped with buffers or not,
cooperative relaying can be divided into two categories, i.e., traditional relaying [28–
31] and buffer-aided relaying [32–48]. In traditional relaying, its transmission manner
is pre-determined, i.e., the source-relay-destination transmission manner. The main
basis for selection strategy is the Max-Min principle, i.e., the involved link/relay is
selected to maximize the minimum instantaneous secrecy capacity of the two-hop
links. If one link/relay is selected, the information transmission should be finished
in two consecutive time slots. In the previous time slot, the source transmits the
information to the selected relay and the selected relay will directly transmit the
information to the destination in the later time slot. However, this pre-determined
scheduling may lead to significant performance degradation in wireless systems, since
the qualities of the transmitting and receiving channels significantly vary with time
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and such scheduling may prevent the relays from exploiting the best transmitting
and the best receiving channels. For the buffer-aided relaying, the system is able to
store and transmit the information in favorable wireless conditions, which increases
the network’s resiliency, throughput and diversity (see, for example, [50] [51]). Thus,
each information now may experience three processes, i.e., the source-relay transmis-
sion process, queuing process in a relay buffer, and the relay-destination transmission
process. Accordingly, in each time slot, there are three possible transmission states,
i.e., source-relay transmission, relay-destination transmission, and no transmission.
The analysis has shown that buffering can provide improved throughput, increased
stability region, and better traffic load for each relay. Compared with the traditional
relaying protocol, the authors in [36] showed that buffer-aided relaying can achieve a
full diversity gain which is two times the number of relays in the network. Different
from other PHY security techniques above, the relaying protocol technique is easy
to be implemented as the sophisticated transmission techniques or explicit synchro-
nization process are not required. Furthermore, the relaying protocol can be flexibly
designed according to the states of CSI of the eavesdropper channel.
1.2 Objective and Main Works
This thesis focuses on the design of buffer-aided relaying protocol to ensure the
security of wireless communications, taking into consideration the practical imple-
mentation under various network scenarios. Our objective is to fully explore the
diversity gain of buffer and design the effectively secure communication protocol
for buffer-aided relaying systems, while satisfying the various QoS requirements of
users. Towards this end, we first design the communication protocols to ensure the
transmission security and communication QoS of the two-hop buffer-aided relaying
system with/without the instantaneous CSI at the transmitter, respectively, where
the eavesdropper can intercept the information in both two hops. Considering the
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delivery delay constraint, we then design a novel security/delay-aware communica-
tion protocol for a two-hop buffer-aided relaying system with multiple relays. Four
commonly-used performance metrics are of particular interest, which are the end-to-
end (E2E) secrecy outage probability (SOP), throughput, secrecy throughput (ST),
and packet discarding probability (PDP). E2E SOP characterizes the probability that
the eavesdropper can decode the information without error. Throughput and ST char-
acterize the long-term time-average on the number of messages that are successfully
and securely delivered on both hops from the source to the destination, respectively.
PDP characterizes the sum of the probability that the information is discarded at the
source node and all relays due to expiration. The main works and contributions of
this thesis are summarized in the following subsections.
1.2.1 Secure Communication Protocol for Buffer-Aided Relaying Systems
This work studies the design of the buffer-aided relaying protocol for two net-
work scenarios that the instantaneous CSI of eavesdropping channel is available and
unavailable. By now, a substantial amount of works have been devoted to the de-
sign of link selection schemes for guaranteeing PHY security performance in relaying
networks [32, 34–36, 39, 43] (Please refer to Section 2.1 for related works). Even
though these works demonstrated that activating the advisable link with favorable
channel conditions can enhance the transmission security, however, how to conduct
link selection to reconcile the transmission security with communication QoS is still
an open issue. As a step forward in this direction, this work investigates the important
trade-off issue between transmission security and communication QoS and designs the
corresponding link selection policies. This work considers a practical eavesdropping
scenario, in which the eavesdropper passively intercepts data transmission which can
be hardly monitored. In addition, we adopt the assumption that the exact instanta-
neous/statistical CSI of the eavesdropping channel is unavailable, which differs from
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the assumption in existing works. The main contributions of this work are four-fold:
• We design link selection policies to ensure the communication security for both
cases that the instantaneous CSI is available/unavailable at the source, which
adopt adaptive-rate transmission mechanism and fixed-rate transmission mech-
anism, respectively. Particularly, according to the qualities of legitimate chan-
nels, the policies fully utilize the flexibility provided by buffer-aided relaying to
select source-to-relay, relay-to-destination, or no link transmission, which are
different from the conventional simple on-off schemes.
• We develop an analytical framework for the performance evaluation of proposed
link selection policies. The closed-form expressions of three fundamental met-
rics, i.e., end-to-end secrecy outage probability (SOP), system throughput and
secrecy throughput are derived, respectively.
• We explore the performance optimization issues and propose an iterative al-
gorithm to optimize the link selection parameters. The study of performance
optimizations reveals the inherent tradeoffs between the transmission security
and communication quality of service (QoS), providing insightful guidelines for
the practical configuration of link selection schemes to satisfy various system
requirements.
• We conduct simulations to demonstrate the validity of theoretical performance
evaluation, and also provide extensive numerical results to illustrate the effi-
ciency of the proposed link selection policies for the secure communication in
wireless cooperative networks.
1.2.2 Security/Delay Aware Protocol for Buffer-Aided Relaying Systems
It is worth noting that all the available works are based on the ideal assumption
that the packet lifetime is unlimited (Please refer to Section 2.2 for related works).
8
However, in many practical wireless networks, packets are regarded to be invalid
once the delivery time exceeds a limited validity period, especially for the delay-
sensitive networks such as vehicular networks and military networks. Therefore, it is
of great importance to further investigate the system design and performance analysis
of buffer-aided relaying networks with limited packet lifetime. As the first attempt
in this direction, this work proposes a novel security/delay-aware communication
protocol for the end-to-end packet delivery in a wireless relaying network with limited
packet lifetime, where multiple buffer-aided relays help the source forward packets to
the destination and a passive eavesdropper wiretaps the data transmission. In this
context, the limited packet lifetime will cause the complex heterogeneous queuing
problem in the buffers, and meanwhile, the interaction among transmission security,
efficiency, and the delivery delay will greatly increase the difficulty of the system
performance evaluation. To address these issues, we develop a Markov chain-based
theoretical framework to fully characterize the packet occupancy process in the relay
buffers, which enables the fundamental system performance metrics to be derived in
closed-form. The main contributions of this work are three-fold:
• A secure and delay-aware communication protocol: We propose a novel commu-
nication protocol to guarantee the security and timeliness of packet transmis-
sion in a buffer-aided relaying system with limited packet lifetime. Our protocol
tracks the instantaneous CSI of transmission channels, the real-time buffer state
as well as the packet delivery delay, and then grants the source and relays dif-
ferent transmission priorities such that a flexible interaction among the security
requirement, transmission efficiency, and delay constraint can be achieved.
• A theoretical framework for network performance modeling: We first built a
delicate current deliver time (CDT) bitmap structure to fully depict the packet
occupancy processes and packet delay updates in the buffer queues. Then, we
9
apply the Markov chain theory to model the state transition process of the
bitmap caused by operating the proposed communication protocol, such that
the stationary occupancy state distribution of the relay buffer can be obtained.
With the help of the stationary state distribution, we eventually derive the
closed-form expressions of three fundamental system-level performance metrics
under two fading channel cases, including reliable outage probability, packet
discarding probability and achievable secrecy throughput.
• Extensive simulation and numerical results: We conduct extensive simulations
and also provide plentiful numerical results to validate the efficiency of our
theoretical analysis framework as well as to demonstrate the performance of
the proposed communication protocol. These results testify that the proposed
communication protocol can guarantee both the transmission security and time-
liness of the considered network. The optimal parameter settings of the protocol
to cope with different performance requirements are also discussed.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter II introduces the
related works of this thesis. In Chapter III, we introduce our work regarding the de-
sign of secure communication protocol for two-hop buffer-aided relaying systems, and
Chapter IV presents the work on the design of security/delay-aware communication
protocol for two-hop buffer-aided relaying systems with multiple relays. Finally, we
conclude this thesis in Chapter V.








M Number of relays
m (m ∈M) The m-th relay
m∗ (m∗ ∈M) Selected message relay
k (k ∈M) Selected jammer
L Buffer Size
E{·} Expectation operator
|hi,j|2 Channel gain of link from node i to j
Ωi,j Average channel gain of link from node i to j
σi Noise variance of node i
γi,j Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of link i to j
pi Transmission power of node i
I Indicator variable of the link decision
Rt Codeword rate
Rs Target confidential message rate
Ci,j Instantaneous channel capacity of link i to j
α, β Link selection parameter




F (·) Cumulative-density-function (CDF)
Pup A given threshold of secrecy outage probability
βi Interference cancellation factor of node i
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D Relay selection decision
tc Current deliver time (CDT)
td Deliver time (DT)
ta The time that the packet arrives at the destination
node
τ Packet lifetime
Ui CDT bitmap of node i
U = {Us, U1, U2, . . . , UM} The CDT bitmap set of the sytem
S = {S1, S2, . . . , SI} The state set of Markov chain (MC)
πi The unique stationary probability distribution of Si
A The state transition matrix of the MC in Si
Ai,j The state transition probability from Si to Sj
ΨSi The total number of the available links in Si
ΨsmSi The number of the available s→ m links in Si
ΨmdSi The number of the available m→ d links in Si
GPNIl The link set where the involved relay owns l packets
GDSId The link set where the delay sate information of the
oldest packet of the involved relay is d
Pro The reliable outage probability (ROP)
Pdis The packet discarding probability (PDP)




This chapter introduces the existing works related to our study in this thesis,
including the works on the design of secure communication protocols with/without
deliver delay constraint for two-hop buffer-aided relaying wireless systems.
2.1 Secure Communication Protocol for Buffer-Aided Relay-
ing Systems
By now, many works have been devoted to the design of secure communication
protocol for buffer-aided relaying networks. These works mainly focused on two-hop
relaying systems with single/multiple relays. For the scenario with single relay, the
protocol design reduces to the selection of a link among the links of source-relay,
relay-destination and source-destination to enhance the PHY security of the system.
Taking into account the transmission efficiency and security constraint, Huang et al.
[32] designed the novel link selection scheme in a two-hop buffer-aided relaying net-
work to achieve tradeoff between secrecy throughput and secrecy outage probability.
Considering that the relay operate in full-duplex (FD), the authors proposed a secure
communication protocol that allows the relay to switch between the FD mode and
half-duplex (HD) mode. The optimal setting of mode switching probability was ex-
amined in [33] for the maximization of secrecy network throughput. Considering that
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the power control can significantly improve the secrecy capacity, the optimal joint link
selection and power control protocol that maximize the secrecy throughput was pro-
posed in [34]. This work was then extended to the buffer-aided network assisted by an
energy harvesting relay in [35], the authors considered two cases, i.e., the knowledge
of the energy harvesting and fading channels states is known in a non-causal man-
ner (offline) and causal manner (online), two secure communication protocols were
designed to ensure the transmission efficiency and information security, respectively.
Regarding the two-hop relaying systems with multiple relays, Chen et al. [36]
put forward the max-ratio (MR) selection scheme for half-duplex decode-and-forward
(DF) relaying networks. The MR scheme activates the link with the largest chan-
nel gain ratio based on the knowledge of both legitimate and wiretap channel state
information (CSI), and it can achieve a better secrecy performance than the conven-
tional max-min-ratio scheme [37]. For the relay system with direct source-destination
link, the authors in [38] proposed a communication protocol based on artificial noise
injection, where the node not involved in the transmission serves as a jammer for
noise injection. The secrecy throughput maximization issue was also explored in [38]
under certain SOP constraint. For a buffer-aided relaying MIMO system, the au-
thors proposed a joint transmit antenna and relay selection protocol to enhance the
secrecy performance [39]. Then, this work was extended to the more general network
scenario with multi-antenna destination, the authors in [40] proposed three secure
communication protocols for secrecy improvement i.e., 1) maximal-ratio combining
(MRC), 2) maximal-ratio combining/cooperative jamming (MRC/CJ), and 3) zero-
forcing beamforming/cooperative jamming (ZFB/CJ). The secrecy diversity gains of
the proposed protocols were analyzed for different relay numbers and buffer sizes. The
authors in [41] proposed the novel communication protocol to secure the transmission
in a buffer-aided MIMO relaying system with multiple eavesdroppers system. The
optimal transmission rates were derived to maximize the average secrecy throughput
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under the intended secrecy outage probability constraint.
These works demonstrated that secure communication protocol is flexible and
promising for achieving a desirable PHY security performance for buffer-aided relay-
ing systems. It is notable, however, that current protocols are based on the ideal
assumption on the CSIs of eavesdropping channels, and the conventional protocols
cannot ensure the security for both hops, especially when the channel quality of
eavesdropping channels is better than the ones of main channels. Furthermore, in
order to secure the information transmission, they would reduce the transmission op-
portunities and sacrifice other performance of the network. Thus, one natural and
crucial question arises: how to design the communication protocol while securing
the E2E security and satisfying the communication QoS. Answering this question is
very important for the applications of buffer-aided relay systems in future wireless
communication scenarios.
2.2 Security/Delay-Aware Communication for Buffer-Aided
Relaying Systems
Since the pioneer works of Zlatanov [50] [51], the various communication protocols
have been proposed to enhance the PHY security performances for buffer-aided relay-
ing systems [32–41]. However, the buffer at the relay can introduce additional delay to
the communication between the source and destination due to its buffer queuing pro-
cess and relay selection process. First, activating the relay-destination link, a packet
at the source or the head of a certain relay queue may have to wait for a long time
(i.e., service time) before it is served by the selected link; Second, the buffer queuing
process, i.e., the process when a packet moves from the end of the relay queue of a cer-
tain relay to the head of this queue, may also incur a long queuing delay at the relay
since a relay usually needs to help forward multiple packets. In current wireless sys-
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tems, multimedia traffic such as mobile video has surged significantly, and the delay
has become an important consideration. Thus, the benefits of the buffer-aided relay
under delay constraints were further investigated in [42]. The authors considered the
instantaneous qualities of the involved links but also took the states of the queues at
the buffers into account, and proposed two heuristic but efficient delay-constrained
protocols to approach the throughput upper bound for a buffer-aide relaying systems.
Motivated by this work, the authors in [43] studied of E2E security and delay per-
formances for two-hop buffer-aided relaying systems with Max-Ratio communication
protocol. Based on the established Markov theoretical framework, a clear trade-off
between the E2E security performance and delay performance was revealed. In order
to decrease the transmit delay, the authors proposed a secure cooperative transmis-
sion protocol with the optimization of transmit delay in [44]. The rateless code and
multicast scheme was applied to make sure that multiple relays can obtain total data
reliably with a lower transmission delay. With consideration of the small buffer size
in [45], one novel communication protocol named max-weight secure link selection
(MWSLS) was designed to ensure the security and delay constraint. However, the
more hazardous scenarios with diversity-combining eavesdroppers that combine the
signals in two hops to decode the packets are largely ignored. The authors in [46]
proposed two communication protocols to ensure the security and delay for perfect
and partial eavesdropper CSIs, respectively.
However, it is worth noting that all the existing works only consider the statistic
delay constraint. In practical wireless networks, the information is regarded to be
invalid once the delivery time exceeds a given limited validity period. Therefore,
the communication protocol needs to be carefully designed which can ensure the
transmission security and provide flexible control of both the secrecy throughput and
packet delay. Furthermore, the new analytical framework needs to be established to
model the packet discarding behavior at both source and relays due to outdate.
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CHAPTER III
Secure Communication Protocol for Buffer-Aided
Relaying Systems
This chapter investigates the secure communication in a two-hop cooperative wire-
less network, where a buffer-aided relay helps forward data from the source to des-
tination, and a passive eavesdropper attempts to intercept data transmission from
both the source and relay. To ensure the transmission security and communication
quality of service (QoS) of the system, we design novel link selection policies for
two cases that the instantaneous channel state information is available or unavail-
able at the source node. For evaluating the system performance, we then derive the
closed-form expressions of end-to-end secrecy outage probability, system throughput
and secrecy throughput, respectively. Based on the theoretical performance analy-
sis, we further explore the performance optimization issues, revealing the insightful
tradeoffs between transmission security and QoS. An iterative algorithm is developed
to identify the optimal setting of link selection parameters, which is helpful for the
practical configuration of link selection policies to satisfy various system performance
requirements. Finally, we conduct simulations to validate our theoretical performance
analysis, and also provide extensive numerical results to illustrate the efficiency of the









Figure 3.1: Illustration of system model.
3.1 System Model and Definitions
In this section, we introduces the system models and some basic definitions in
detail.
3.1.1 Network Model
As shown in Fig. 3.1, we consider a two-hop wireless cooperative network which
consists of a source (Alice), a destination (Bob), a relay (Relay) and a passive eaves-
dropper (Eve). We assume that there is no direct link from Alice to Bob so that
the messages from Alice can be delivered to Bob only via Relay. Relay is equipped
with infinite buffer to temporarily store the messages from Alice and operates in the
half-duplex mode, thus it can not transmit and receive simultaneously. Moreover, we
apply the randomize-and-forward (RF) strategy [52]. Different from the conventional
DF relaying, the buffer-aided RF relaying allows the decoded data to be stored in
the relay buffer temporarily and be forwarded to Bob by adopting the independent
and randomized signal transmission in some future time slot. Thus, a time slot is
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not divided into two halves. We assume that Alice and Relay transmit messages with
fixed power Pa and Pr, respectively. Eve attempts to intercept signals from both
Alice and Relay, but due to the RF strategy, it cannot process the signals from two
hops by applying combing techniques such as MRC [53].
We consider the single relay scenario in this study mainly due to the following
reasons. First, the mathematical tractability under the single relay scenario allows
us to gain important insights into the link selection design for security-QoS tradeoffs.
Second, the analysis under the single relay scenario lays the foundation for the analysis
under the multiple relay scenarios.
3.1.2 Wireless Channel Model
We consider a time-slotted system where the time is divided into successive slots
with equal duration. All wireless links are characterized by the quasi-static Rayleigh
block fading such that the channel fading coefficient of each link remains constant
during one time slot, but changes independently and randomly from one time slot
to the next. We use hi,j[k] to denote the fading coefficient from node i to node j
at time slot k, where i ∈ {a, r}, j ∈ {r, b, e} and k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T}, here a, r, b, e
are short for Alice, Relay, Bob and Eve, respectively, and T is the total observation
time. With the quasi-static Rayleigh block fading model, the channel gain of a link
is independently and exponentially distributed with mean E{|hi,j[k]|2} = Ωi,j, where
E{·} is the expectation operator. In addition, complex additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) is imposed on each link and its variance at Relay, Bob and Eve are δ2r , δ
2
b
and δ2e , respectively. Therefore, the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) γi,j[k]
































Figure 3.2: Illustration of transmission scheduling process in a time slot.














Ωi,j. Considering the fact that Eve is a passive eavesdropper, the
instantaneous CSIs from Alice and Relay to Eve, i.e., ha,e[k] and hr,e[k], are unavailable
in this study.
3.2 Secure Communication Protocol Design
In order to ensure the transmission security for the concerned system, we de-
sign the link selection policies in two cases that the instantaneous CSI is avail-
able/unavailable at Alice. We first present the overall scheduling of the policies in a
time slot, and then detail the link selection strategies and corresponding transmission
mechanisms in the two cases, respectively.
3.2.1 Transmission Scheduling
Regarding the transmission scheduling process in a time slot, in order to ensure
the transmission security and avoid channel outage [54], we first need to estimate
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the instantaneous CSIs of legitimate links. Then, link selection can be conducted
according to some strategies. Finally, the system conducts transmission operation or
remains idle according to the selection decision. Therefore, as illustrated in Fig. 3.2,
the overall scheduling of our link selection policies consist of the following three stages.
Stage 1 (CSI Estimation)
Alice and Bob transmit the pilot sequences to Relay in turn. By assuming
that the reciprocity property [55] of antenna holds, Relay can estimate the
CSIs of both Alice-to-Relay and Relay-to-Bob links.
Stage 2 (Link Selection)
With the CSIs of two links, Relay acts as the central node to make link
selection decision based on some strategies. According to that whether Relay
feeds back the CSI to Alice, we consider the following two cases.
a) CSI is available at Alice: Relay makes link selection decision based
on the strategy described in Subsection 3.2.2. If Alice-to-Relay link is
selected, Relay feeds back the decision signal and the CSI to Alice.
b) CSI is not available at Alice: Relay makes link selection decision based
on the strategy described in Subsection 3.2.3. If Alice-to-Relay link is
selected, Relay only feeds back the decision signal to Alice.
Stage 3 (Message Transmission)
According to the link selection decision, Alice or Relay transmits the message,
or the system remains idle. The details of transmission mechanisms in the
two cases will be introduced in Subsections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, respectively.
Remark 1 It is worth noting that the overall scheduling of our policies incurs at most
three handshakes before the actual message transmission, thus the system operation is
21
of low-complexity. The overhead includes n pilot symbols for the channel measurement
(which is determined by the channel estimation methods), 4-bit channel quality index
(CQI), and 1-bit for link selection declaration (1 and 0 indicates that the link is and
is not selected for transmission, respectively.)
3.2.2 Link Selection Policy with CSI Feedback
With the existing link selection policies such as [32], either Alice-to-Relay or Relay-
to-Bob link is selected for data transmission in any time slot. However, since the
eavesdropper Eve intercepts messages from both links, once in a time slot the channel
qualities of both legitimate links are worse than those of corresponding wiretap links,
the transmission security cannot be ensured no matter which link is selected.
With the above observation, in our new policy the system will remain idle when
both the legitimate links are not of good quality. Specifically, we let Ik be an indi-
cator variable to denote the link decision in time slot k, where Ik = 0, Ik = 1 and
Ik = −1 indicate the selection of Alice-to-Relay link, Relay-to-Bob link and no link,
respectively.
To guarantee the secure transmission, we employ the well-known Wyner’s encod-
ing scheme [14]. When a transmission is conducted, the transmitter (Alice or Relay)
chooses two rates, one is the codeword rate Rt, another is the confidential message
rate Rs. The difference between the two rates Re = Rt−Rs, i.e., the rate redundancy,
reflects the cost of secrecy transmission against eavesdropping. If the wiretap chan-
nel capacity is larger than Re, i.e., Ce > Re, the secrecy outage happens. Thus, the
necessary condition of secure transmission is Rt ≥ Rs + Ce. Let Ra,r[k] and Rr,b[k]
denote the codeword rates when Alice and Relay are selected for transmission at
time slot k, respectively. Under the policy with CSI feedback, since Alice and Relay
know the the corresponding instantaneous CSI, they adaptively adjusts the codeword
rate to be arbitrarily close to the channel capacity, termed as adaptive-rate (AR)
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transmission. Therefore, Ra,r[k] and Rr,b[k] can be determined as
Ra,r[k] = Ca,r[k] = log2(1 + γa,r[k]), (3.3)
Rr,b[k] = Cr,b[k] = log2(1 + γr,b[k]), (3.4)
where Ci,j[k] denotes the channel capacity between nodes i and j, and it is determined
by the Shannon Theorem [13].
Note that we consider the practical scenario where the instantaneous/statistical
CSI of the wiretap channel is unknown, Alice (resp. Relay) cannot judge that whether
Ra,r[k] ≥ Rs + Ca,e[k] (resp. Rr,b[k] ≥ Rs + Cr,e[k]) holds. Hence, we adopt two non-
negative parameters α and β to serve as the thresholds for the channel qualities of
two legitimate links, respectively. Only if the condition γa,r[k] ≥ α (resp. γr,b[k] ≥ β)
is satisfied, Alice-to-Relay (resp. Relay-to-Bob) link can be selected for message
transmission. If γa,r[k] < α and γr,b[k] < β, no link will be selected. When both the
legitimate links are of high channel quality, i.e., both γa,r[k] ≥ α and γr,b[k] ≥ β hold,












Finally, in order to guarantee the codeword rate of the selected link can cover the
confidential message rate Rs, i.e., Ra,r[k] ≥ Rs and Rr,b[k] ≥ Rs, we ensure that the
thresholds need to satisfy α ≥ 2Rs − 1 and β ≥ 2Rs − 1. Therefore, our link selection
algorithm with CSI feedback can be summarized as Algorithm 1.
3.2.3 Link Selection Policy without CSI Feedback
With the concern of system complexity and overhead, we also explore the link
selection policy without CSI feedback. Since the design is similar to that in the
previous subsection, we only explain the differences in the link selection algorithm
and corresponding transmission mechanism.
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Algorithm 1 Link Selection Algorithm with CSI Feedback
Require:
Instantaneous CSIs of two legitimate links, confidential message rate Rs and thresh-
olds α and β which satisfy α ≥ 2Rs − 1 and β ≥ 2Rs − 1;
Ensure:
Link decision indicator Ik, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T};
for k = 1; k ≤ T ; k + + do
Calculate γa,r[k] and γr,b[k] based on the instantaneous CSIs;



















For the link selection policy without CSI feedback, when Alice-to-Relay link is
selected, the transmitter Alice don’t know the corresponding instantaneous CSI, thus
it cannot adaptively adjust the codeword rate to be the channel capacity. Instead,
Alice always sets the codeword rate Ra,r[k] as a fixed rate Ra (Ra ≥ Rs), termed as
fixed-rate (FR) transmission . When Relay-to-Bob link is selected, the codeword
rate Rr,b[k] is the same as (3.4) since Relay always knows the instantaneous CSI.
Same as the previous subsection, we also adopt two non-negative parameters α
and β to serve as the thresholds for the channel qualities of two legitimate links.
Another consideration is that when Alice conducts the information transmission, if
the instantaneous channel capacity is less than the codeword rate, i.e., Ca,r[k] =
log2(1+γa,r[k]) < Ra, the channel outage happens such that Relay cannot decode the
information correctly. In order to avoid the channel outage, we further design that
Alice-to-Relay link cannot be selected if Relay finds γa,r[k] < 2
Ra − 1, even though
γa,r[k] ≥ α holds. Therefore, our link selection algorithm without CSI feedback can
be summarized as Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Link Selection Algorithm without CSI Feedback
Require:
Instantaneous CSIs of two legitimate links, fixed codeword rate of Alice Ra, confi-
dential message rate Rs and thresholds α and β which satisfy Ra ≥ Rs, α ≥ 2Rs−1
and β ≥ 2Rs − 1;
Ensure:
Link decision indicator Ik, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T};
for k = 1; k ≤ T ; k + + do
Calculate γa,r[k] and γr,b[k] based on the instantaneous CSIs;

















For a better understanding of our link selection policy without CSI feedback,
we illustrate in Fig. 3.3 the value of Ik in different SNR regions. We can see from
Fig. 3.3(a) that when we set the threshold α ≥ 2Ra − 1, the value of Ik in different
SNR regions decided by the policy without CSI feedback is the same as that with
CSI feedback. However, if we set the threshold α < 2Ra − 1, for the interval γa,r[k] ∈




, Ik is still set to be 1 once
γr,b[k] > β is satisfied, as shown in the triangle area of Fig. 3.3(b).
3.3 Performance Evaluation and Optimization
In this section we evaluate the performance for our proposed link selection policies.
We focus on three widely-used fundamental performance metrics including secrecy




































Figure 3.3: The value of Ik in different SNR regions. (a) α ≥ 2Ra−1. (b) α < 2Ra−1.
analytical framework to derive their closed-form expressions.
3.3.1 Secrecy Outage Probability
According to Wyner’s encoding scheme [14], for a transmission over a wireless
channel wiretapped by an eavesdropper, the event of secrecy outage refers to the case
that the transmission rate redundancy (i.e., the difference between the codeword rate
and the confidential message rate) is less than the channel capacity of wiretap link,
such that the message can be decoded by the eavesdropper. Secrecy outage proba-
bility (SOP) is defined as the probability that the event of secrecy outage happens.
Therefore, the end-to-end (E2E) SOP of the system is the probability that the event
of secrecy outage happens on at least one of the two hops when a message is delivered
from Alice to Bob. The E2E SOP is of great significance as it serves as a measure of
the transmission security level.
Let Γa,r[k] and Γr,b[k] be two indicator variables defined as
Γa,r[k] =







1, Rr,b[k]−Rs < Cr,e[k]
0. otherwise
(3.6)
Based on the above definitions, the SOPs of Alice-to-Relay link and Relay-to-Bob
link are given by1
P a,rso = Pr{Γa,r[k] = 1|Ik = 0}, (3.7)
P r,bso = Pr{Γr,b[k] = 1|Ik = 1}. (3.8)
Therefore, the end-to-end (E2E) SOP can be formulated as
Pso = 1− (1− P a,rso )(1− P r,bso ). (3.9)
In order to derive the closed-form expression for SOP, we first need the following
two lemmas.
Lemma 1 The probability PA that Alice is selected to transmit message at a time
slot is determined as
PA =

µ(α, β), for AR case
ν(α, β), for FR case ∧ α < 2Ra − 1
µ(α, β), for FR case ∧ α ≥ 2Ra − 1
(3.10)
where µ(α, β) and ν(α, β) are given by















1Since the channel gain of a link is independent and identically distributed in each time slot, the
SOP of a link is the same in each time slot and the time indicator k can be omitted.
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and ∧ is the logical AND operator.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2 The probability PR that Relay is selected to transmit message at a time
slot is determined as
PR =

µ̄(α, β), for AR case
ν̄(α, β), for FR case ∧ α < 2Ra − 1
µ̄(α, β), for FR case ∧ α ≥ 2Ra − 1
(3.13)
where µ̄(α, β) and ν̄(α, β) are given by




































Proof: The proof is the same as that for Lemma 1, so we omit it here.
Then, based on the exact results of PA and PR, we have the following theorem
regarding the closed-form expression of SOP.
Theorem III.1 (Secrecy Outage Probability) For a concerned cooperative net-
work with the system models described in Section 3.1, we apply the link selection













































































































secrecy outage probability is given by
Pso = 1−

ω(α, β,Rs) · ϕ(α, β,Rs), for AR case
ω̄(Rs) · ϕ̄(α, β,Rs), for FR case ∧ α < 2Ra − 1
ω̄(Rs) · ϕ(α, β,Rs), for FR case ∧ α ≥ 2Ra − 1
(3.16)
where ω̄(Rs) is determined as







ω(α, β,Rs), ϕ(α, β,Rs) and ϕ̄(α, β,Rs) are expressed as (3.18)-(3.20), respectively.
Proof: Considering the case of AR transmission mechanism (i.e., link selection
policy with CSI feedback), based on formula (3.7), we have
P a,rso = Pr{Γa,r[k] = 1|Ik = 0} =




where Pr{Ik = 0} is given by equation (3.11) and




























By substituting (3.11) and (3.22) into (3.21) as well as some integral and algebraic
calculations, we can obtain the expression of ω(α,β,Rs) as (3.18).
Similarly, based on formula (3.8), we have
P r,bso = Pr{Γr,b[k] = 1|Ik = 1} =
Pr{Γr,b[k] = 1, Ik = 1}
Pr{Ik = 1}
, (3.23)
where Pr{Ik = 1} is given by equation (3.14) and





























By substituting (3.14) and (3.24) into (3.23) as well as some integral and algebraic
calculations, we can obtain the expression of ϕ(α,β,Rs) as (3.19).
Considering the case of FR transmission mechanism (i.e., link selection policy
without CSI feedback), based on formula (3.7), we have
P a,rso = Pr
{





= Pr {Ra − Ca,e < Rs} = ω̄(Rs). (3.25)
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When α ≥ 2Ra − 1, we can observe from Fig. 3.3 that P r,bso in the FR case is the
same as that in the AR case, so we have P r,bso = ϕ(α, β,Rs). When α < 2
Ra − 1,
according to formula (3.8), we have
P r,bso = Pr{Γr,b[k] = 1|Ik = 1} =
Pr{Γr,b[k] = 1, Ik = 1}
Pr{Ik = 1}
, (3.26)
where Pr{Ik = 1} is given by equation (3.15) and








α < γa,r[k] < 2
Ra − 1, β < γr,b[k] <
β
α






















By substituting (3.15), (3.24) and (3.27) into (3.26) as well as conducting some inte-
gral calculations, we can obtain the expression of ϕ̄(α,β,Rs) as (3.20). By substituting
the above results into formula (3.9), Pso can be expressed as (3.16).
Based on Theorem III.1, we have the following corollary.














, for AR case



















where ω̄(Rs) is expressed as (3.17).
3.3.2 Throughput and Secrecy Throughput
The system throughput Φ and the secrecy throughput (ST) ΦS are defined as the
long-term time-average on the number of messages (in units of bits/slot) that are
delivered and securely delivered on both hops from Alice to Bob, respectively.
They are of great significance since the throughput reflects the communication quality
of service (QoS) of the system, while ST serves as an integrated measure for both the
security and QoS performance.
We use Qr[k] to denote the amount of confidential data (in units of bits) stored












) ·min{Rs, Q[k − 1]}. (3.30)
Note that the E2E SOP refers to the probability that the event of secrecy outage
happens on at least one of the two hops when a message is delivered from Alice to
Bob. Therefore, (1 − Pso) is the probability that a message is securely delivered on
both hops, and ST can be formulated as
ΦS = Φ · (1− Pso). (3.31)
Theorem III.2 (Throughput and Secrecy Throughput) For a concerned co-
operative network with the system models described in Section 3.1, we apply the link
selection policies proposed in Section 3.2 for information transmission, then the sys-
tem throughput Φ is determined as
Φ = min{PA, PR} ·Rs (3.32)
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and the secrecy throughput ΦS is determined as
Φs = min{PA, PR} ·Rs · (1− Pso), (3.33)
where PA, PR and Pso are given by (3.10), (3.13) and (3.16), respectively.
Proof: In order to derive the closed-form expression for the system throughput,
we analyze the queuing process in the buffer of Relay. It is notable that after decoding
the signal from Alice, Relay only need to store the useful data, i.e., the confidential
messages, in its buffer. As a result, the evolution of data stored in Relay’s buffer at
the next time slot can be characterized as
Qr[k + 1] =

Qr[k] +Rs, Alice-to-Relay is selected
{Qr[k]−Rs}+, Relay-to-Bob is selected
Qr[k], No link is selected
(3.34)
where {x}+ = max{x, 0}.
By regarding Rs bits of confidential data as one packet, then the packet arrival
process at the buffer of Relay is a Bernoulli process with arrival probability PA, the
packet service process at the buffer of Relay is also a Bernoulli process with service
opportunity PR. Therefore, the Relay can be characterized as a Bernoulli/Bernoulli
queue [56].
Let πi denote the probability that there are i packets stored in the buffer of Relay
at the stationary state, then the stationary distribution of the number of packets















, and H is the normalization constant. Notice that Π·1 = 1,
where 1 is a column vector with all elements being 1, we have
π0 =

0, PA ≥ PR
1− PA
PR
. PA < PR
(3.35)
The system throughput is the departure rate of the Bernoulli/Bernoulli/queue,
thus it can be determined as
Φ = PRRs · (1− π0) = min{PA, PR} ·Rs. (3.36)
Then, the ST can be determined as
Φs = Φ · (1− Pso) = min{PA, PR} ·Rs · (1− Pso). (3.37)
Based on the results of Theorem III.2, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 A necessary condition of the throughput Φ reaching its maximum is
PA = PR, i.e., the Relay queue is at the edge of non-absorbing state.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.2.
Remark 2 From Theorem III.2, we can find that: (1) The system throughput is
heavily affected by the transmission chances of both Alice and Relay. Thus, when
the channel qualities of the two hops are significantly different, i.e., γa,r  γr,b or
γa,r  γr,b, the values of the thresholds α and β need to be deliberately selected to
ensure the transmission chances of both Alice and Relay, such that a non-zero system
throughput can be guaranteed; (2) The secrecy throughput only counts for the messages
that are securely delivered on both hops.”.
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3.3.3 Performance Optimization
From the performance evaluation, we can find that the thresholds α and β as well
as the confidential message rate Rs will determine the E2E SOP, system throughput
and secrecy throughput. Moreover, it is worth noting that improving the transmis-
sion security usually comes with a cost of QoS (i.e., the system throughput) degra-
dation [57–60]. Therefore, the design of α, β and Rs is of great significance to enable
the system to meet various performance requirements and achieve optimal security-
throughput tradeoffs.
To this end, in this section we address the following three fundamental problems.
P1: Under the condition that a certain degree of transmission security is ensured, i.e.,
the E2E SOP does not exceed some threshold θso, what is the maximum throughput
the system can achieve? P2: Under the condition that a certain degree of throughput
is guaranteed, i.e., Φ is no less than some threshold θΦ, what is the minimum SOP
can be achieved? In addition, since the secrecy throughput is an integrated metric
for the transmission security and communication QoS, we also explore the following
integrated performance optimization problem, i.e., P3: What is the maximum secrecy
throughput the system can achieve? It should be pointed out that addressing these
problems can reveal us important insights into the link policy design for coping with
different demands of various practical applications.
With the help of the results of performance evaluation, problems P1, P2 and P3
can be mathematically formulated as the following optimization issues, respectively.
P1: max
Rs,α,β
Φ = min{PA, PR} ·Rs (3.38a)
s.t. Pso ≤ θso, (3.38b)
min{α, β} ≥ 2Rs − 1, (3.38c)




Pso = 1−(1−P a,rso )(1−P r,bso ) (3.39a)
s.t. Φ ≥ θΦ, (3.39b)
min{α, β} ≥ 2Rs − 1 ≥ 0, (3.39c)
P3: max
Rs,α,β
Φs = min{PA, PR} ·Rs · (1−Pso) (3.40a)
s.t. min{α, β} ≥ 2Rs − 1 ≥ 0. (3.40b)
Notice that problems P1 and P3 contain the form of “max−min”, we can elim-
inate such a form by transforming the original problem into two sub-problems. We
take problem P1 in AR case as an example. According to the expressions (3.11) and
(3.12), we have PA ≤ PR for γ̄a,rβ ≤ γ̄r,bα, and PA > PR for γ̄a,rβ > γ̄r,bα. Thus, P1




s.t. Pso ≤ θso,






s.t. Pso ≤ θso,
min{α, β} ≥ 2Rs − 1 ≥ 0,
γ̄a,rβ > γ̄r,bα,
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The optimal solution of P1 can be obtained by comparing the maximum throughput
of sub-P11 and sub-P12.
From the results of performance evaluation, we can see that the expressions of
Pso, Φ and Φs are all in complicated forms and thus it is very difficult to obtain the
analytical solutions for the optimization problems. Therefore, we develop an iterative
search algorithm inspired by the Zoutendijk Method [61] to asymptotically approach
the optimal solutions. Since maximizing Φ and Φs is equivalent to minimizing −Φ and
−Φs, respectively, we let our iterative search algorithm focus on the feasible descend
directions of −Φ in P1 and −Φs in P3. Before introducing our algorithm, we need
the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose that the feasible point x(n) = (α(n), β(n), Rs
(n)) is obtained at the
nth iteration, finding the strictly feasible descent direction d(n) at this point is equiv-




s.t. dT∇Ψ(x(n)) ≤ σ, (3.43b)
−dT∇gi(x(n)) ≤ σ, (3.43c)
| dj |≤ 1, j = 1, 2, 3, (3.43d)
where Ψ(x) and gi(x) are the objective and constraint functions, respectively, | · |
denotes the norm of a vector, T is the transpose symbol, ∇ is the gradient symbol,
i is the effective constraint indicator which will be introduced in our algorithm, dj
(j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) denotes the element of d in the α, β and Rs directions, respectively.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.3.
Based on Lemma 3, the optimal solution can be approximated by iteratively
searching in the strictly feasible descent direction d. Therefore, we propose the Link
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Parameters Optimization Algorithm to solve the problems P1, P2 and P3, as sum-
marized in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Link Parameters Optimization Algorithm
Initialization:
Set the initial feasible point x(0), ε0>0 and the convergence tolerance of objective
function ε>0, 0 =⇒ N ;
Ensure:
The optimal link selection parameters x∗
1: Step 1: Determine the effective constraint indicator set: I(x(n), εn) = {| i | 0 ≤
gi(x
(n)) ≤ εn}, then compute the gradient of objective function: ∇Ψ(x(n));
2: if I(x(n), εn) = ∅ and ‖ ∇Ψ(x(n)) ‖≤ ε then
3: stop iteration and x∗ = x(n);
4: else if ‖ ∇Ψ(x(n)) ‖> ε then
5: set −∇Ψ(x(n) = d(n) and σ(n) = −1, then update iteration point: execute
Procedure 1;
6: else
7: find the feasible descend direction: goto Step 2;
8: end if
9: Step 2: Compute the linear programming problem (3.43), then return d(n), σn;
10: if σn = 0 and εn < ε then
11: stop iteration and x∗ = x(n);
12: else
13: update εn =
εn
2
, goto Step 1;
14: end if
Notice that the condition gi(x
(n)) ≤ εn in Step 1 avoids the sawtooth [62], which
ensures the iterative algorithm can converge to the Fritz-John point. A special case
would occur when solving the LP problem (3.43), i.e., the effective constraint set is
a null set but ∇Ψ does not satisfy the convergence condition. To this end, we apply
Procedure 1 to find a new feasible point.
It is notable that Algorithm 3 transforms the nonlinear problem of finding feasible
points into a linear programming problem (41). Thus, the complexity of Algorithm
3 is mainly decided by the procedure for solving the linear programming. Currently,
there are many mature and effective methods for solving the linear programming
problems, such as simplex method, interior point method, etc, and it has been demon-
strated that the complexity of these methods does not exceed the problem dimension
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Procedure 1 Update iteration point
1: Find a suitable step size: for i /∈ I(x(n), εn), first compute amax =
min{ti|(gi(x(n)) + tid(n)) = 0, ti > 0}, then obtain an by solving:{
min Ψ(x(n) + and
(n))
0 ≤ an ≤ amax
2: Update the iteration point: set x(n+1) = x(n) + and
(n);
3: if ‖ x(n+1) − x(n) ‖< ε then
4: stop iteration and x∗ = x(n+1);
5: else
6: update εn = εn for εn ≤ −σn, εn = εn2 for εn > −σn, n = n+ 1, goto Step 1.
7: end if
and a log(1/ε) time [63]. The problems P1, P2 and P3 are three-dimensional. There-
fore, the complexity of Algorithm 3 can be determined as O(log(1/ε)).
3.4 Simulation Results and Discussions
In this section, we first conduct simulations to validate our theoretical analysis
in terms of the E2E SOP, system throughput and secrecy throughput. Based on
the theoretical results, we then provide discussions for the security-QoS tradeoffs.
Finally, we compare the performance of the proposed link selection policies with
another typical one to demonstrate their efficiencies.
3.4.1 Simulation Settings
For the validation of theoretical performance evaluation, a dedicated C++ simula-
tor was developed to simulate the message delivery processes under our link selection
policies, which is available at [64]. With the help of the simulator, we conduct exten-
sive simulations to calculate the simulated results of E2E SOP, system throughput
and secrecy throughput. The duration of each task of simulation is set to be 1× 108
time slots and our link selection policies are performed once per slot. In addition, we
set all the noise variance and the transmission power to be 1, and the average channel
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Figure 3.4: E2E SOP Pso vs. confidential message rate Rs. α = 7.0, β = 8.0, Ra = 3.0
bits/slot for α ≥ 2Ra − 1, Ra = 4.0 bits/slot.
gain of links as Ωa,r = 5dB, Ωr,b = 10dB, Ωa,e = 0dB, Ωr,e = 2dB. Readers can also
flexibly perform our C++ simulator with any other desired parameter settings.
We count the number of bits received by Bob and the number of bits eavesdropped
by Eve in a task of simulation as N0 and N1, respectively. Then, the simulated SOP
is calculated as
Simulated SOP = 100%× N1
N0
. (3.44)










We first summarize in Fig. 3.4 the theoretical and simulation results of E2E SOP
in both AR and FR cases, where we set α = 7.0, β = 8.0, Ra = 3.0 bits/slot for
α ≥ 2Ra − 1 and Ra = 4.0 bits/slot for α < 2Ra − 1. Fig. 3.4 shows clearly that the
simulation results match well with the corresponding theoretical curves for all the
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Figure 3.5: Throughput Φ vs. threshold α. β = 8.0, Rs = 0.5 bits/slot, Ra = 2.0
bits/slot.
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Figure 3.6: Secrecy throughput Φs vs. confidential message rate Rs. α = 7.0, β = 8.0,
Ra = 3.0 bits/slot for α ≥ 2Ra − 1, Ra = 4.0 bits/slot for α < 2Ra − 1.
cases considered here, indicating that our theoretical performance analysis is highly
efficient to evaluate the E2E SOP of the proposed link selection policies. We can also
observe from Fig. 3.4 that the E2E SOP increases monotonically with the increase of
confidential message rate Rs, and a larger fixed codeword rate Ra can achieve a lower
E2E SOP for the FR case.
We then present the plot of theoretical/simulated throughput versus α in Fig. 3.5,
here we set β = 8.0, Rs = 0.5 bits/slot and Ra = 2.0 bits/slot. Fig. 3.5 shows that the
simulated throughput in both cases matches nicely with the theoretical ones, which
41
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(a) E2E SOP vs. transmission rate Ra.



























(b) Throughput vs. transmission rate Ra.
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(c) Secrecy throughput vs. transmission rate Ra.
Figure 3.7: Impacts of transmission rate Ra on system performance. Ωa,r = Ωr,b =
15dB, Ωa,e = 0dB, Ωr,e = 2dB, α = 6.0, β = 8.0.
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demonstrates that our theoretical performance evaluation for the system throughput
of the proposed link selection policies is also highly efficient. From Fig. 3.5, it can
be observed that when α = 2.5 and α = 2.1, the system throughput Φ in AR case
and FR case reaches its peak, i.e., 0.165 and 0.173, respectively. It can be verified by
numerical calculation that PA = PR holds at the throughput peak, which agrees with
the conclusion of Corollary 2.
We further draw Fig. 3.6 to present the theoretical and simulation results of
secrecy throughput in both AR and FR cases, where we set α = 7.0, β = 8.0, Ra = 3.0
bits/slot for α ≥ 2Ra − 1 and Ra = 4.0 bits/slot for α < 2Ra − 1. We can see from
Fig. 3.6 that the simulation results match well with the corresponding theoretical
curves for all the cases considered here, verifying that our theoretical performance
analysis is also highly efficient to capture the secrecy throughput behaviors of the
proposed link selection policies. An interesting observation from Fig. 3.6 is that as Rs
increases the secrecy throughput first increases to a maximal value and then decreases.
This is due to the reason that the secrecy throughput is an integrated measure for both
the security and QoS performance, and the effects of Rs on secrecy throughput are
two folds. On one hand, a larger Rs leads to a larger throughput; on the other hand, a
larger Rs results in a higher SOP. It implies that the tradeoff between the throughput
and E2E SOP leads to the unimodal behavior of secrecy throughput, and we can
optimize the system performance to satisfy various requirements for transmission
security and communication QoS by design appropriate parameters of link selection
policies.
We finally plot Fig. 3.7 to show the simulation and theoretical results of the system
performance with the variation of the codeword rate Ra in the FR case, where we set
Ωa,r = Ωr,b = 15dB, Ωa,e = 0dB, Ωr,e = 2dB, α = 6.0, β = 8.0. Fig. 3.7 shows that the
theoretical curves of all the performance metrics match well with the corresponding
simulation results, which validates the efficiency of our analysis framework. We can
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observe from Fig. 3.7 that as Ra increases, the system throughput monotonically
decreases, while the SOP and secrecy throughput decrease first and then increase.
44

























































(b) Throughput Φ vs. threshold α

































(c) Secrecy throughput Φs vs. threshold α
Figure 3.8: Impacts of thresholds on system performance. Ωar = 5dB, Ωrb = 15dB,
Rs = 0.5 bits/slot, Ra = 3.0 bits/slot for (a) and (b); Ωar = Ωrb = 15dB,
Rs = 3.0 bits/slot, Ra = 4.0 bits/slot for (c).
45
3.4.3 Performance Discussion
Based on the validation of our theoretical performance evaluation, we further
develop a MATLAB simulator [64] to obtain various numerical results for the system
performance.
We plot Fig. 3.8 to show the impacts of threshold α on the system performance.
Fig. 3.8(a) shows that the SOP monotonically decreases as α increases, which indicates
that to achieve a good security performance for the system, we should design a large
value of the threshold in the link selection policy. We can observe from Fig. 3.8(b)
and 3.8(c) that as α increases, both the system throughput and secrecy throughput
first increase and then decrease. These behaviors demonstrate that the threshold has
great impacts on the system performance, so the threshold can be flexibly designed to
enable the system to meet various performance requirements. Since the performance
behavior with the variation of β is similar to that with the variation of α, we omit
the details here.
We summarize in Fig. 3.9 and Fig. 3.10 the optimal values of problems P1, P2
and P3 in AR case and FR case, respectively, where we set γ̄a,r = 10dB, γ̄r,b = 15dB,
and Ra = 4 bits/slot. The horizontal axis of Fig. 3.9(a) and Fig. 3.9(b) as well as the
vertical axis of Fig. 3.9(c) and Fig. 3.9(d) are based on the logarithmic coordinates,
and three different settings of the qualities of eavesdropping channels are considered
there. Fig. 3.9(a) and Fig. 3.9(b) show how the maximum throughput the system
can achieve varies with the constraint on SOP, while Fig. 3.9(c) and Fig. 3.9(d)
show how the minimum SOP can be guaranteed varies with the constraint on system
throughput. We can observe that as θso increases, i.e., the constraint on SOP is
loosed, the system can achieve a larger throughput; while as θΦ increases, i.e., the
constraint on throughput is loosed, a lower SOP can be ensured. It indicates that
important tradeoffs exist between the aspect of transmission security and the aspect
of communication QoS, improving the performance for one aspect will incur a cost of
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(b) Maximum throughput vs. constraint on
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(c) Minimum SOP vs. constraint on throughput
in AR case
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(d) Minimum SOP vs. constraint on through-
put in FR case
Figure 3.9: Optimal values of problems P1 and P2 under different eavesdropping
channel qualities. γ̄a,r = 10dB, γ̄r,b = 15dB, Ra = 4.0bits/slot.
performance degradation of another aspect. Therefore, our theoretical results provide
useful guidelines for the design of link selection policies to satisfy various practical
performance requirements.
Fig. 3.10(a) and Fig. 3.10(b) present the maximum secrecy throughput with the
variations of eavesdropping channel qualities γ̄a,e and γ̄r,e. We can see that as γ̄a,e
and/or γ̄r,e increase, i.e., the situation of transmission being eavesdropped becomes
more serious, the maximum achievable secrecy throughput deteriorates. An interest-
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(b) Maximum secrecy throughput in FR case.
Figure 3.10: Optimal values of problems P3 under different eavesdropping channel
qualities. γ̄a,r = 10dB, γ̄r,b = 15dB, Ra = 4.0bits/slot.
secrecy throughput with the growth of γ̄a,e is faster than that with the growth of γ̄r,e,
which indicates that compared with the eavesdropping of the second hop, the eaves-
dropping of the first hop has a greater impact on the performance of such cooperative
networks.
Comparing the results in Fig. 3.9 and Fig. 3.10, we can further find that the
performance tradeoffs in AR case are better than those in FR case. For example,
under the same settings, the system in AR case can achieve a larger throughput
or a lower SOP than that in FR case. This is due to the benefits brought by the
CSI feedback, which provides the policy with more information to determine the
link selection and codeword rate more appropriately, at the cost of the increase of
operation complexity and system overhead.
Finally, we summarize in Table 3.1 the optimal parameter settings for the problem
P1 in AR case, corresponding to the points in Fig. 3.9(a). From Table 3.1 we can see
that for a larger γ̄a,e or γ̄r,e, we usually need to set a larger α, a larger β and a smaller
Rs to guarantee the SOP does not exceed the pre-specified threshold while maximizing
the system throughput. Readers can kindly utilize our MATLAB simulator to explore
the optimal parameter settings for other optimization problems in both AR case and
48




Constraint on E2E SOP, Θso
0.1% 0.3% 0.89% 2.64% 7.85% 23.36% 69.52% 100%
γ̄ae = 0 dB
γ̄re = 2 dB
α 12.1684 10.8700 9.5293 8.1121 6.5709 4.7549 6.5843 6.5843
β 38.4799 34.3740 30.1345 25.6526 20.779 15.0362 20.821 20.821
Rs 1.1203 1.2437 1.3979 1.5990 1.8740 2.2764 2.9230 2.9230
γ̄ae = 3 dB
γ̄re = 2 dB
α 18.3808 16.0100 13.5998 11.0788 8.3476 5.3339 6.5843 6.5843
β 58.1252 50.628 43.0063 35.0343 26.3975 16.8673 20.8212 20.821
Rs 0.7067 0.8025 0.9282 1.1026 1.3638 1.8111 2.9230 2.9230
γ̄ae = 0 dB
γ̄re = 6 dB
α 13.9589 12.4543 10.9217 9.3109 7.5403 5.3997 6.5843 6.5843
β 44.1419 39.384 34.5375 29.4437 23.8445 17.0755 20.821 20.821
Rs 0.9922 1.1051 1.2451 1.4264 1.6746 2.0499 2.9230 2.9230
FR case, we omit the details here.
3.4.4 Comparison Results
In order to demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed link selection policies on
ensuring secure communication for two-hop cooperative networks, we further present
extensive numerical results for the performance comparison with the typical policies:
Max-Link policy [65], Max-Ratio policy [36] and the policy in [32] in AR case and FR
case, respectively. Specially, in order to explore the effect of buffer state on the link
design and performance analysis, we incorporate the buffer state into the proposed
policies and consider the following Algorithm 4 termed as WBS-LSP.
It is worth noting that the policies in [32] always conduct data transmission (either
Alice-to-Relay or Relay-to-Bob) in all time slots, while our policies only conduct
data transmission when there is a good opportunity (i.e., either of the links is in a
good condition). For clarity of exposition, we term our proposed policies as OT-LSP
(opportunistic transmission link selection policies), and the policies in [32] as AT-LSP
(always transmission link selection policies) hereinafter. Unless otherwise specified,
we set γ̄a,r = 10dB, γ̄r,b = 15dB, γ̄a,e = 0dB, γ̄r,e = 2dB and Ra = 3 bits/slot.
1) Performance Comparison in AR Case
We summarize the comparison results of the tradeoffs between system throughput
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Algorithm 4 Buffer State-aware Link Selection Algorithm
Require:
Instantaneous CSIs of legitimate links, confidential message rate Rs, transmission
rate Ra (Ra ≥ Rs), thresholds α and β and buffer occupancy state information;
Ensure:
Link decision indicator Ik, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T};
1: for k = 1; k ≤ T ; k + + do
2: Check the buffer occupancy state;
3: if The buffer is empty then
4: Calculate γa,r[k] based on the instantaneous CSIs;
5: if γa,r[k] ≥ α for AR case (γa,r[k] ≥ max (α, 2Ra − 1) for FR case) then
6: Ik = 0;
7: else
8: Ik = −1;
9: end if
10: else
11: Apply Algorithm 1 for AR case or apply Algorithm 2 for FR case;
12: end if
13: end for
and E2E SOP in Fig. 3.11. From Fig. 3.11(a), we can observe clearly that OT-LSP
outperforms AT-LSP in improving the throughput performance when θso is less than
0.42, but it is inferior to the latter as we further relax the constraint on SOP. A
similar behavior can be seen in Fig. 3.11(b), where the system can achieve a lower
SOP with OT-LSP until θΦ is more than 0.8 bits/slot. Such behaviors are due to the
reason that our primary aim is to achieve secure communication, improving the level
of transmission security inevitably leads to a degradation of communication QoS, thus
the proposed OT-LSP sacrifices some parts of communication QoS to realize a high
security performance. Otherwise, we can also observe that the value of maximum
throughput Φ first increases and then keeps constant as θso gradually increases. That
is because that, as θso increase, the feasible region of problem (3.38) increases, and φ
increases. But when θso increases to 0.6952, Rs, α and β are optimal and φ reaches
its peak. After that, even θso increases, the value of maximum throughput keeps
constant.
We then provide Fig. 3.12 to show the behaviors of maximum secrecy throughput
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(a) Maximum throughput vs. constraint on
SOP.
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(b) Minimum SOP vs. constraint on through-
put.
Figure 3.11: Comparisons of the tradeoffs between throughput and E2E SOP in AR
case.










































Figure 3.12: Comparison in terms of maximum secrecy throughput in AR case.
the system can achieve with OT-LSP, Max-Link, Max-Ratio and AT-LSP. We can see
from Fig. 3.12 clearly that the maximum achievable secrecy throughput with OT-LSP
is always superior to that with the other policies, indicating that the proposed link
selection policy in AR case is efficient for achieving secure communication in two-
hop cooperative networks. A more careful observation is that as γ̄a,e increases, the
performance gap between the two policies gradually increases, which implies that as
the eavesdropping situation becomes more serious, our link selection policy can bring







































(a) Maximum throughput vs. constraint on
SOP.





























(b) Minimum SOP vs. constraint on through-
put.
Figure 3.13: Comparisons of the tradeoffs between throughput and E2E SOP in FR
case.
From Fig. 3.11 and Fig. 3.12, we can see that all results with WBS-LSP matches
nicely with the proposed policy in AR case. It is because that the backlogged source
leads to few empty buffer states. Even we don’t consider the buffer state in this work,
the proposed policies are still effective for security-QoS tradeoffs for AR case.
2) Performance Comparison in FR Case
Regarding the FR case, it is worth noting that the event of channel outage (i.e.,
the event that the transmission rate exceeds the channel capacity) can be completely
avoided with OT-LSP but is inevitable with AT-LSP. Therefore, for the sake of fair-
ness, we provide comparison results under two typical restrictions for channel outage
probability (termed ROP in [32]) of AT-LSP, i.e., ROP ≤ 0.1 which approaches the
effect of OT-LSP, and ROP ≤ 1 which means there is no restriction on channel outage
probability. In Fig. 3.13, the performance of OT-LSP and AT-LSP is compared in
terms of the tradeoffs between throughput and E2E SOP. From Fig. 3.13(a) we can
see that the system throughput with OT-LSP is higher than that with AT-LSP for
ROP ≤ 0.1, and such a behavior generally holds even for ROP ≤ 1. Similarly, Fig.
3.13(b) shows that when θΦ ≤ 0.5 bits/slot, the minimum E2E SOP declines by an
order of magnitude with OT-LSP compared with AT-LSP. For ROP ≤ 1, OT-LSP
52















































Figure 3.14: Comparison in terms of maximum secrecy throughput in FR case.
still outperforms AT-LSP until θΦ exceeds 0.8 bits/slot.
Finally, we summarize the performance of secrecy throughput in Fig. 3.14. This
figure shows clearly that the maximum secrecy throughput can be achieved by the
system with OT-LSP is superior to that with Max-Link, Max-Ratio, and also is su-
perior to that with AT-LSP for both ROP ≤ 0.1 and ROP ≤ 1. In particular, for
ROP ≤ 0.1, i.e., AT-LSP will approach the effect of OT-LSP on channel outage, OT-
LSP can make a great improvement for secrecy throughput. All above comparison
results indicate that the proposed link selection policy can ensure secure communica-
tion efficiently while avoiding the channel outage.
Similar with the AR case, we can see that the numerical results with WBS-LSP
still match with ones with the proposed policy from Fig. 3.13 and Fig. 3.14. It indicate
the proposed policy is still effective for security-QoS tradeoffs for FR case. Otherwise,
readers can kindly utilize our MATLAB simulator to simulate the communication
process and investigate how many the number of time slots in which the buffer is
empty state, we omit the details here.
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3.5 Summary
This chapter proposed two secure communication protocols for two-hop buffer-
aided relaying systems. The theoretical analysis of the E2E SOP, system throughput
and secrecy throughput were conducted to model the communication QoS and se-
curity performance of the proposed policies. Some fundamental optimization issues
were further explored to provide insights into the performance tradeoffs. Extensive
simulation and numerical results indicate the proposed policies can efficiently improve
the transmission security and satisfy various system performance requirements by op-
timizing the policy parameters. It is expected that the results in this study can pave
the way for the design of communication protocol to achieve secure communication
in more complicated wireless networks. Notice that, in this work, we only consider
that the confidential message rate is fixed. Thus, a future direction is to apply the
dynamic confidential message rate to further improve the performance in buffer-aided
relaying systems. Furthermore, we only provide simulation results for the link selec-
tion scheme with the consideration of buffer state. Therefore, in our future work we
will further investigate how to theoretically evaluate the corresponding system per-
formance. Another appealing research direction is to investigate the design of secure




for Buffer-Aided Relaying Systems
This chapter investigates the security/delay-aware communication in a wireless
relaying system, where the packet lifetime is limited, multiple buffer-aided relays help
the source forward packets to the destination, and a passive eavesdropper attempts to
wiretap the transmissions over both hops. To guarantee the end-to-end transmission
security and timeliness in the network, we design a novel communication protocol
that grants transmission nodes different priorities for packet delivery based on the
wireless channel state, real-time buffer state, and packet delay requirement. For
performance evaluation of the proposed protocol, we then develop a Markov chain-
based theoretical framework to fully characterize the packet occupancy process in
the relay buffers. With the help of this framework, we further derive under two
typical fading channel cases the closed-form expressions for three fundamental system
performance metrics, namely reliable outage probability, packet discarding probability
and achievable secrecy throughput. Finally, we present extensive simulation and
numerical results to validate our theoretical results, as well as to demonstrate the
efficiency of the proposed protocol for ensuring secure and timely communication in

























Figure 4.1: System model.
4.1 System Model and Assumptions
We consider a buffer-aided relaying system as shown in Fig. 4.1, which is composed
of a source node s, multiple buffer-aided relay nodes, a destination node d and an
eavesdropping node e. The number of relays is M and the set of relays are denoted
as M = {1, 2, . . . ,M}. There is no direct link from s to d so that the data of s can
be delivered to d only via relays. The transmitted data is counted in packets. Node s
has an infinite buffer for storing the external packets, while each relay node m ∈ M
has a finite buffer of L packets. We assume that all nodes are equipped with a single
antenna and operate in the half-duplex mode, and all the buffer queues follow the
First-In-First-Out (FIFO) discipline.
We consider the eavesdropper e can wiretap the transmission over both hops.
When forwarding a packet, each relay adopts the randomize-and-forward decoding
strategy such that the eavesdropper cannot perform the maximal-ratio combining to
process the received signals of the two hops [52]. The transmission time is split into
successive slots with equal duration, and each packet is assumed to own a lifetime of τ
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time slots. Moreover, we adopt the non-selective Rayleigh block fading channel model
where the channel coefficients of all links are constant during one time slot but change
independently from one time slot to another. We use hi,j[n] to denote the complex-
valued fading coefficient of a channel from transmitter i to receiver j at time slot n
(i ∈ {s}
⋃
M, j ∈ {d, e}
⋃
M, i 6= j), and the channel gain gi,j = |hi,j[n]|2 follows the
exponential distribution with mean Ωi,j. We assume that the CSI associated with a
legitimate receiver is perfectly available, while the instantaneous CSI associated with
the eavesdropper is unavailable but the channel distribution information (i.e., Ωs,e
and Ωm,e) is available. The additive white Gaussian noise at node j is denoted as nj
with variance δj.
To improve the transmission security and timeliness of the system, our communi-
cation protocol (as elaborated in Section 4.2) can employ an idle relay as a jammer
to disrupt the received signal at the eavesdropper. Meanwhile, all relays adopt the
technique of successive interference cancellation (SIC) but have different SIC capabil-
ities. Let βm (0 ≤ βm ≤ 1) denote the SIC factor of relay m, e.g., βm = 0 represents
the perfect SIC and βm = 1 indicates m cannot use SIC. When node i transmits a
signal xi to node j, the received signals yj at node j and ye at the eavesdropper e can

















Pkhk,exk + ne, relay k is selected as a jammer.
(4.2)
where Pi is the transmission power of node i, Pk and xk are the jamming power and
jamming signal of relay k, respectively.
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4.2 Security/Delay-Aware Communication Protocol Design
In this section, we first present the necessary condition of the secure transmission,
and then combine it with the packet occupancy state in the relay buffer as well as
the packet delivery delay information to design a novel communication protocol for
the concerned system.
To ensure the secrecy of transmitted packets, the transmitters employ the eminent
Wyner’s encoding scheme [14]. When conducting transmission, a transmitter chooses
two rates, one is the codeword rate Rt, another is the confidential data rate Rs.
Since we can only obtain the statistical information of eavesdropping channels, the
secrecy outage [17, 66] (i.e., the event that the transmission rate redundancy Rt −
Rs is less than the channel capacity of wiretap channel) would occur, which means
existing information leakage to the eavesdropper. Fortunately, we can guarantee
information leakage under a certain level by selecting a favorable relay. For the
extreme situation when all links are in low channel quality, we can select an advisable
relay as a cooperative jammer to increase the transmission opportunity and reduce the
data waiting time. Overall, these results are summarized as the following proposition.
Proposition 1 To ensure the secrecy outage probability (SOP) Pso is less than a
given threshold Pup (i.e., Pso ≤ Pup), if no relay is selected as a jammer the channel
gain of the transmission link s→ m or m→ d must satisfy the following condition
gs,m[n] ≥ θs and gm,d[n] ≥ θm, (4.3)
where θs = −2−RsΩs,e lnPup and θm = −2−RsΩm,e lnPup. If relay k is selected as a
jammer, the channel gains of the transmission and jamming links s→ m, m→ k or
m→ d, k → d must satisfy
gs,m[n] ≥ gk,m[n]Ξmsk and gm,d[n] ≥ gk,d[n]Ξdmk, (4.4)
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where Ξmsk = 2
RsβmΩs,e(1−Pup)/(PupΩk,e), Ξdmk = 2RsβdΩm,e(1−Pup)/(PupΩk,e), and
Rs is the intended secrecy rate.
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.1.
In each time slot, we should first find out the link sets of the first and second
hop satisfying the condition (4.3), which are denoted as DR1 and DR2 , respectively. We
group all events into two cases, i.e., case 1: DR1 /∈ ∅ or DR2 /∈ ∅, and case 2: DR1 ∈ ∅
and DR2 ∈ ∅. For case 1, when DR2 /∈ ∅, to keep the packet fresh we give the highest
priority to the involved relay which owns the oldest packet for transmission. When
DR2 ∈ ∅ and DR1 /∈ ∅, to reduce the packet waiting time we give the highest priority to
the involved relay which owns the fewest packets for reception. If there exist multiple
relays owning the fewest packets, we can select one of them uniformly.
For case 2, due to the packet lifetime limitation, we can select a proper relay as a
cooperative jammer to degrade the reception of the eavesdropper so as to increase the
transmission opportunity. For each relay, we can find out all feasible jammers where
the corresponding transmission and jamming links satisfy the condition (4.4). We
denote the effective partner pair sets for the first and second hop as DR,J1 and D
R,J
2 ,
respectively. When DR,J2 /∈ ∅, for the same reason as case 1, we select the relay m
with the oldest packet as the transmitter and select another relay k which causes the
least interference at the destination (i.e., min{gk,dβd}) as the jammer. Similarly, when
DR,J2 ∈ ∅ and D
R,J
1 /∈ ∅, we select the relay m with the fewest packets as the receiver
and select the relay k which leads to the least interference at m (i.e., min{gk,mβm})
as the jammer. When DR,J1 ∈ ∅ and D
R,J
2 ∈ ∅, the system will be idle in this time
slot.
Consequently, based on the above principles and considerations, we propose the
secure and delay-aware communication protocol for the buffer-aided relaying system
with limited packet lifetime, as summarized in Algorithm 5.
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Algorithm 5 Security/Delay-Aware Communication Protocol
Require:
Instantaneous CSIs of legitimate links, intended secrecy rate Rs, upper bound of
SOP Pup, interference cancellation factor βm and βd;;
Ensure:
Selection decision D;
1: Find out the link sets DR1 and DR2 where the channel gains satisfy the condition
(4.3) for the first and second hop, respectively
2: if DR2 /∈ ∅ then
3: Use the involved relay m for transmission which owns the oldest packet in DR2
and D = m;
4: else if DR2 ∈ ∅ and DR1 /∈ ∅ then







7: Choose one m∗ of them uniformly to receive the message and D = m∗;
8: else
9: Choose the only one m∗ to receive the message and D = m∗;
10: end if
11: else
12: Determine whether there are relay-jammer pairs that satisfy condition (4.4), if
yes, execute Procedure 2 and find out the optimal partner pair;
13: end if
Return D;
4.3 CDT Bitmap Framework for Packet Delivery Delay Mod-
eling
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Procedure 2 Find out the optimal partner pair
1: Find out all possible partner pairs for both hops, where the effective sets are
denoted as DR,J1 and D
R,J
2 , respectively, where
• DR,J1 = {(m, k)|satisfy the condition (4.4)}
• DR,J2 = {(m, k)|satisfy the condition (4.4)}
2: if DR,J2 /∈ ∅ then
3: Choose relay m∗ that owns the oldest packet as the transmitter in DR,J2 , then
choose the corresponding jammer k = min{gk,dβd}, thus D = (m∗, k);
4: else if DR,J1 /∈ ∅ and D
R,J
2 ∈ ∅ then
5: Choose relay m∗ that owns the fewest packets as the receiver in DR,J1 , then
choose the corresponding jammer k = min{gk,mβm}, thus D = (m∗, k);
6: else
7: The system is reliable outage and D = ∅;
8: end if
4.3.1 CDT Bitmap Modeling
In this section, we construct the delicate CDT bitmap to track the packet oc-
cupancy and delay information in the buffer queue. For a better understanding of
the packet discarding behaviors at the source or relays, we introduce the following
definitions.
Current Deliver Time (CDT) tc: CDT is defined as the difference between
the current time slot t and the time slot ts that the packet arrives at the head of the
source queue, i.e., tc = t− ts.
Deliver Time (DT) td: DT is defined as the difference between the time slot ta
that the packet arrives at the destination node and the time slot ts that the packet
becomes the head packet in source queue, i.e., td = ta − ts.
Note that each packet needs at least two time slots to reach the destination node,
such that the CDT of the packet in the source (resp. relay) queue is required to
0 ≤ tc ≤ τ − 2 (resp. τ − 1) (otherwise the packet will be discarded). Besides, the
DT for each packet must be more than two time slots but less than the lifetime τ ,
i.e., 2 ≤ td ≤ τ . With the help of the above definitions, we can track the DT for each
61
packet, check overdue packets and drop the packets with CDTs exceeding the delay
constraint in the buffer of source and relays before transmission.
According to Algorithm 5, in each time slot we need to track both the packet
number and delay information before the selection decision. For easy tracking, we
create a specific structure for source and relays which can fully depict the information.
Note that each packet reaches and departs the buffer queue at different time slots,
thus the specific structure cannot be modeled as a sequential backlog form, which is
referred to as the heterogeneous queuing problem. To build the buffer state space that
is flat and mathematical trackable, CDT bitmap is introduced to carefully study the
problem.
CDT bitmap: We use U = {Us, U1, U2, . . . , UM} to denote a set of integers and
each element of U is called CDT bitmap of the corresponding node, which has a
fixed bit-width of τ − 1. Due to the infinite backlog, the least significant bit (LSB)
of the CDT bitmap Us of the source node always equals 1 indicating the existence of
a head packet with 0 CDT delay, and the most significant bit (MSB) indicates to the
existence state of a packet with the maximum tolerable CDT delay τ − 2. For the
CDT bitmap Um of relay m, the LSB equals 1 (resp. 0) means the existence (resp.
absence) of a packet with 1 CDT delay and the MSB means the existence state of a
packet with the maximum tolerable CDT delay τ − 1.
Therefore, the packet number and delay information can be uniquely represented
by the number and position of the non-zero bits of the CDT bitmap, respectively.
Expediently, we use the functions ψ(Um) and φ(Um) to backtrack the number of filled
non-zero bits and the position of the oldest packet for node m, respectively. Benefiting
from the CDT bitmap, we can track the state transitions of the buffer queue by
some useful bitwise operations caused by the decision of the proposed protocol. The
operations are summarized as follows.
Um  1: This bitwise “left-shift” operation shifts every bit of Um to one bit left,
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the MSB is discarded and a new 0 is moved into the LSB position. This operation
corresponds to the case where a packet has stayed in the queue for one more time
slot, and any packet exceeding the delay constraint is dropped.
Um
⊕
V: This bitwise “XOR” operation inverts the positive bit in Um with the
same position in V , where V is an integer with only one positive bit. This operation
corresponds to the case where a packet should be cleared.
Um
⊗
V: This bitwise “OR” operation converts the bit 0 of Um into the positive
one with the same position in V , where V has the same assumption as above. This
operation is useful to demonstrate that a packet enters into the buffer queue.
By applying these bitwise operations, we can flexibly attach each network event
to the corresponding state update of CDT bitmap.
Source Transmission: If the source is selected to transmit a packet, the head
packet will depart from the buffer queue, and then the second packet will become the
new head packet. Thus, the CDT bitmap update of the source node is given by





For all relays, the packets stay in the buffer queue for more one slot, and the arrival
packet will be added into the buffer queue of the selected relay m. Recall that the
packet position in the source node represents the packet delay minus one, but the
packet position in relays represents the packet delay. Therefore, while updating the
CDT bitmap of relays, we only invert the bit whose position is corresponding to the
transmitted packet but not perform the shift operation in Um. The CDT bitmap






Um  1, otherwise.
(4.6)
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Relay Transmission: If the non-empty relay m (i.e., ψ(Um) 6= 0) is selected
to transmit a packet, the bit in the position of the oldest packet will be set to zero
and the delay of other uninvolved packets are added to more one slot. Thus, we can





2φ(Um)−1) 1, if m=m∗,
Um  1, otherwise.
(4.7)
Similarly, the delay of the head packet in the source buffer increases by one time slot
and the CDT update of the source node is
U rs = Us  1. (4.8)
Reliable Outage: For reliable outage event, no transmission occurs and updating
the CDT bitmap of source and relays only perform the shift operation, which is
respectively given by
U os = Us  1 and U om = Um  1. (4.9)
4.3.2 CDT Bitmap Analysis
In this section, we develop a Markov Chain-based theoretical framework to ana-
lyze the CDT bitmap established in Subsection 4.3.1. First, we study the states of
MC resulting from the proposed communication protocol. Then we derive the state
transition matrix under both the i.n.d (independent but non-identically distributed)
and i.i.d (independent and identically distributed) channel models. Finally, we derive
the MC stationary distribution.
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4.3.2.1 States of Markov Chain
Recall that each node state can be denoted by its corresponding CDT bitmap,
thus we can utilize the possible CDT bitmaps of the source and relays to track all
states of the concerned system. We denote the state set of MC as S = {S1, S2, . . . , SI},
where Si = {U is,UiM} (i ∈ I) is the i-th state where UiM = {U i1, U i2, . . . , U iM}. The
total number of MC states is equal to all possible combinations of the CDT bitmap.
Although the impacts of all possible events are determined and conceptually simple,
a refined formula determining the number of MC states is quite arduous. We know
that a new state results from any one of the source transmission, relay transmission,
and reliable outage events. Therefore, for a given set of states, we can find all asso-
ciated states based on the CDT bitmap. For example, for Si = (U
i
s,UiM), the new
state transferred by the outage behavior, we only need to compute U os and UoM by
using (4.9), and determine whether (U os ,UoM) is a new state or not. For the new
states resulting from source transmission, due to the possibility that the source may
transmit the packet to anyone relay, we need to track all possible states and update
the states set S. Similarly, for the new states resulted from relay transmission, we
should consider any non-empty relay may transmit the packet to the destination.
Thus, for the given number M of relays and the packet lifetime τ , we can find
out all possible states of the concerned system. First, we set the initial state of the
system as S = S1 where S1 = (1, {0, 0, . . . , 0}), which means only one packet with
0 delay is stored in the source queue. Second, we track and identify the new states
caused by the possible decisions of the proposed communication protocol, and add
the new states into S. Then, we repeat tracking the possible states connected with
the unchecked states until all states in S are checked. The algorithm is concluded as
Algorithm 6.
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Algorithm 6 States of MC Searching Algorithm
Require:
The initial state of the system to S={SI} where I=1 and S1 =(1,0, 0, . . . ,0);
Ensure:
Find out all possible MC states S with the proposed Algorithm 5;
1: while there is an unchecked state in S do
2: Select any unchecked state Si, compute U
t
s, UrR, U rs , UtR, U os and UoR according
to (4.5)-(4.9), respectively
3: for (j = 1; j ≤ I; j + +) do
4: a. compare the new state (U os ,UoM) with the state Sj that is caused by the
outage behavior;
b. compare the new states (U ts,UrM) with the state Sj that is caused by the
source transmission;
c. compare the new states (U rs ,UtM) with the state Sj that is caused by any
relay m transmission;
5: if U ts 6= U js or UoM 6= U
j
M then
6: Set I = I + 1 and add the new state SI+1 = (U
t
s,UoM) into S;
7: else if U ts 6= U js or UrM 6= U
j
M then




10: Set I = I + 1 and add the new state SI+1 = (U
r




Return all possible MC states S;
4.3.2.2 Derivation of State Transition Matrix
The state transition matrix represents the MC of each node CDT bitmap and
models the connectivity between them. It is a key element of the proposed ana-
lytical framework and its construction is also fundamental for the computation of
performance metrics. Let Xt(t≥0) denote the discrete-time Markov random process
capturing the evolution of the network as a system. Also, let A denote all state
transition matrix of the MC, in which the entry
Ai,j = P(Si → Sj) , P(Xt+1 = Sj|Xt = Si). (4.10)
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represents the probability to move from sate Si at time t to state Sj at time t +
1. In order to construct the state transition matrix A, identifying the connectivity
between the different states of the system is of paramount importance. Notice that
the connectivity is not only related to the number of the available links, but also
related to the packet number and delay information. Thus, we first calculate the
total numbers of the available links, and then categorize relays based on the packet
number and delay information in the buffers.
The total number ΨSi of the available links. For state Si, the number of the
available s→ m links ΨsmSi is equal to the number M of relay. Only a relay with non-
empty buffer (i.e., ψ(U im) 6= 0) can be selected to transmit the data. Consequently,








1, if ψ(U im) > 0,
0, otherwise.
(4.12)




+ ΨmdSi . (4.13)
Categorization of the available links. According to Algorithm 5, the protocol
decision depends on the packet number and delay information. Thus, categorizing
the available links is inevitable to track the state transition matrix. We define the
sets GPNIl to categorize the available links based on the packet number l, i.e., the
number of the filled elements in the bitmap of the corresponding relay, which stores
the indices of link s→ m. As mentioned above, the buffer can store up to τ packets.
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Thus, l = ψ(U im)) and l ∈ {0, 1, . . . , τ}. The set GPNIi (l) is defined to count the








1, if ψ(U im) = l,
0, otherwise.
(4.15)
Otherwise, we use the sets GDSId to categorize the available links based on the delay
sate information of the involved relay bitmap, which stores the indices of the link
m→ d. Likewise, we let the set GDSIi (d) count the number for each element in GDSId








1, if φ(U im) = d,
0, otherwise.
(4.17)
Based on the above formulations, we can derive the state transition probabilities
(4.10) of the connected states caused by the protocol decisions, which are given by
the following theorems and corollaries.
Theorem IV.1 Assume that all channels are i.n.d Rayleigh fading channels and
suppose that the system is in sate Si at current time slot, the probability that the









where ΘDSIid denotes the probability that the channel equality of all m → d (md ∈
GDSId ) does not satisfy the condition (4.3) and (4.4) at state i, and it is given by
ΘDSIid =






where p1md is given by








































the functions Γu(x, y, z) and Tu(x, y, z) are denoted as



















, u = m,
(4.22)




Similarly, ΘPNIin denotes the probability that the channel equality of s → m (sm ∈
GPNIl ) does not satisfy the condition (4.3) and (4.4), and it is given by
ΘPNIil =











where p1sm is given by






























Corollary 3 When all channels are i.i.d Rayleigh fading channels, the probability






















































Theorem IV.2 Assume that all channels are i.n.d Rayleigh fading channels and
suppose that the system is in sate Si, the probability that the source transmission
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ΘDSIid , D = (m∗, k) ∧ 0 < l∗ < τ − 1,
(4.31)
where l∗ is the packet number in the buffer of the selected relay m∗, Gsm∗l∗ is the subset
of GPNIl∗ which contains the link index sm∗, P1(Gsm
∗
l∗ ) and P2(Gsm
∗
















Γs (Ωs,m̂) , (4.32)
P2(Gsm
∗





Γs (Ωs,m) , (4.33)
P1km∗ is the probability that the optimal partner pair (m∗, k) is selected where relay m∗















































Corollary 4 Assume that all channels are i.i.d Rayleigh fading channels and suppose
that the system is in sate Si, the probability that the source transmission leads to
























































Theorem IV.3 Assume that all channels are i.n.d Rayleigh fading channels and
suppose that the system is in sate Si, the probability that relay m
∗ transmission
leads to the connected state Sj is given by
Ai.n.di,j =





Γm (Ωm,d) , D = m∗ ∧ 0 < d∗ < τ − 1,
∏
m6=m∗,k








(ω̄m̄ − ω̃m̂), D = (m∗, k) ∧ 0 < d∗ < τ − 1,
(4.37)
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where d1 = φ(U im̄), d


















































































Corollary 5 Assume that all channels are i.i.d Rayleigh fading channels and suppose
that the system is in sate Si, the probability that relay m
∗ transmission leads to the
connected state Sj is given by
Ai.i.di,j =

1− Γm∗ (Ωm∗,d) , D = m∗ ∧ d∗ = τ − 1,
Pm∗t , D = m∗ ∧ 0 < d∗ < τ − 1,
Pm∗kt (ΨmdSi − 2), D = (m
∗, k) ∧ d∗ = τ − 1,
Pm∗kt (χ1)Pm
∗k
o (χ2), D = (m∗, k) ∧ 0 < d∗ < τ − 1,
(4.41)





















Pm∗kt (x) and Pm
∗k
o (x) are given in (4.43) and (4.44), respectively,































Proof: The proof of Theorem IV.1 and Theorem IV.2 are given in Appendix B.2
and Appendix B.3. The proof of Corollary 1 is the same as that of Theorem IV.1,
and the proofs of Corollary 2, Theorem IV.3 and Corollary 3 are similar to that of




































































4.3.3 Derivation of MC Stationary Distribution
From the above theorems and corollaries, we can see that Ai,j 6= 0. Furthermore,
we know that the state transition is caused by source transmission, relay transmission








i,j = 1, which means the state
transition matrix A is a column stochastic. Otherwise, it is possible to get to any
state from state Sj(j ∈ I), i.e., the Markov chain is irreducible and positive recurrent.
Thus, it can be readily verified that the Markov chain has a time invariant state
distribution [67]. We denote the unique stationary probability distributions as πΛ =
[πΛS1 , . . . , π
Λ
Si
, . . . , πΛSI ]
T , such that πΛ = AπΛ and
∥∥πΛ∥∥ = 1, where Λ ∈ {i.n.d, i.i.d}.


















where <Si (<Sj) is the set of states that have the same stationary probability with
Si (Sj), {(Si,<Sj) ({(Sj,<Si)) is the set of states that Si (Sj) has to pass through to
reach a state in <Si (<Sj).
4.4 Performance Analysis
With the help of the stationary probability distribution of MC, in this section,
we derive the closed-form expressions of some fundamental performance metrics, in-
cluding the reliable outage probability (ROP), packet discard probability (PDP) and
secrecy throughput (ST).
Derivation of ROP. When the transmission security of the packet cannot be
ensured, the system will be temporary sleeping, which is called the reliable outage. As
stated in Algorithm 5, a reliable outage occurs if and only if all links are in the outage,
and the probability depends on the state of the system. Therefore, the total outage
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where pΛou(Si) is given by (4.18) when Λ = i.n.d, and p
Λ
ou(Si) when Λ = i.i.d is given
by (4.27).
Derivation of PDP. With consideration of the transmission timeliness of the
packet, one of the main targets for the proposed protocol is to reduce the number
of discarded packets. The PDP Pdis of the concerned system equals to the sum of
the probability that the packets are discarded at the source node and all relays in all












where XΛ(Si) is the probability that the packet is discarded at the source node in








s) = τ − 1,
0, otherwise.
(4.51)
where pΛsm(Si) is given by (4.31) when Λ = i.n.d, and (Λ = i.i.d), p
Λ
sm(Si) is given by
(4.35) when Λ = i.i.d. Y Λm (Si) is the probability that the packet is discarded from
relay m in state Si. Note that there is at most one packet in relay queues would reach
the lifetime. Thus, Y Λm (Si) is given by
Y ΛSi =





Table 4.1: Average Channel Gain of Links for I.n.d Case
Channel Gain Ωs,1 Ωs,2 Ωs,3 Ωs,4 Ω1,d Ω2,d Ω3,d Ω4,d Ωs,e
settings 12 dB 15 dB 15 dB 18 dB 10 dB 25 dB 20 dB 14 dB 5 dB
Channel Gain Ω1,e Ω2,e Ω3,e Ω4,e Ω1,2 Ω1,3 Ω1,4 Ω2,3 Ω2,4 Ω3,4
settings 5 dB 12 dB 15 dB 8 dB 2.5 dB 2 dB 3 dB 5 dB 4 dB 3.5 dB
where pΛmd(Si) is given by (4.37) when Λ = i.n.d, and p
Λ
md(Si) is given by (4.41) when
Λ = i.i.d.
Derivation of achievable ST. The achievable ST Q is defined as the average









where pΛmd(Si) is the same with the one in (4.52).
4.5 Simulation Results and Discussions
In this section, we first conduct simulations to verify the efficiency of the theoreti-
cal framework for performance modeling, and then provide numerical results to show
the impacts of the protocol’s parameters on the system performance.
4.5.1 Simulation Settings
To validate the theoretical performance evaluation, a dedicated MATLAB sim-
ulator was developed to simulate the packet delivery process under the proposed
communication protocol, which is available at [64]. With the help of this simulator,
we conduct extensive simulations to calculate the simulated results of ROP, PDP and
achievable ST. The duration of each task of simulation runs throughout 1× 106 time
slots and the corresponding protocol is performed once per slot for both i.i.d and i.n.d
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cases. We set all the noise variances and the transmission power to be 1 Watts/Hz,
the relay number M = 4, and SIC factors β1 = 0.4, β2 = 1.0, β3 = 0.6, β4 = 0.8. The
detailed settings of average channel gains for i.n.d case are summarized in Table 4.1,
and for i.i.d case we set Ωs,i = 15 dB, Ωi,d = 17.25 dB, Ωs,e = 5 dB and Ωi,e = 8 dB,
where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The average channel gains between relays are set as Ωi,j = 3.56
dB, where i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and i 6= j.
We count the number of time slots that the system reliable outage happens in a
task of simulation as T , the numbers of packets transmitted by the source and received
at the destination as N0 and N1, respectively, and the numbers of packets discarded
at the source and the relays as N2 and N3, respectively. Then, the simulated ROP is
calculated as
Simulated ROP = 100%× T
1× 106
. (4.54)
The simulated PDP and achievable ST are respectively calculated as
Simulated PDP = 100%× N2 +N3
N0
, (4.55)





We first summarize in Fig. 4.2, Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4 the simulation and theoretical
results of the system performance under the variation of secrecy rate Rs, where we
set Pup = 0.1 and τ = 10. Then, Fig. 4.5, Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7 present the simulation
and theoretical results that how the system performance varies with the upper bound
of SOP Pup, where we set Rs = 0.5 and τ = 10. Finally, we plot Fig. 4.8, Fig. 4.9 and
Fig. 4.10 to show the simulation and theoretical results of the system performance
under the variation of packet lifetime τ , where we set Rs = 0.5 and Pup = 0.1.
From these figures, we can see that all the simulation results match nicely with the
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Figure 4.2: Reliable outage probability Pro vs. secrecy rate Rs.
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Figure 4.3: Packet discarding probability Pdis vs. secrecy rate Rs.
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Figure 4.4: Achievable secrecy throughput Q vs. secrecy rate Rs.
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corresponding theoretical curves for both the i.i.d and i.n.d cases, indicating that
our theoretical framework is highly efficient to model the fundamental system-level
performance for the concerned system with the proposed communication protocol.
A more careful observation from Fig. 4.2∼Fig.4.10 is that there are very small gaps
between the simulation and theoretical results. Such gaps are mainly due to the
approximations in (B.2) and (B.4), which make the theoretical results shift slightly
from the exact ones.
4.5.3 Performance Discussions
4.5.3.1 Pro vs. Rs/Pup/τ
Fig. 4.2, Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.8 show how Pro varies with Rs, Pup and τ , respec-
tively. We can see from Fig. 4.2 and Fig. 4.5 that Pro increases monotonically as
the secrecy rate Rs increases, but decreases monotonically as the upper bound of
SOP Pup increases. Such behaviors are consistent with Proposition 1 that a larger Rs
and Pup will result in fewer transmission opportunities at both the source and relays.
Fig. 4.8 shows that as the lifetime τ increases Pro first decreases quickly and then re-
mains almost constant. This is due to the reason that according to Algorithm ?? the
transmission behaviors of nodes are jointly determined by the security and lifetime
constraints, but when τ increases to a specific value, they are dominated only by the
security constraint. Additionally, we can observe that the system can always achieve
a lower Pro under the i.n.d case compared with that under the i.i.d case.
4.5.3.2 Pdis vs. Rs/Pup/τ
We then discuss the impacts of Rs, Pup and τ on the PDP Pdis. From Fig. 4.3,
Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.9, we can observe that the PDP Pdis increases monotonically as Rs
increases, but decreases monotonically with the growth of Pup and τ . This is because
that a larger Rs and/or a lower Pup can result in fewer transmission opportunities
80
1 10



































Figure 4.5: Reliable outage probability Pro vs. secrecy rate Pup.
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Figure 4.6: Packet discarding probability Pdis vs. upper bound of SOP Pup.
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Figure 4.7: Achievable secrecy throughput Q vs. upper bound of SOP Pup.
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and increase the service time in the buffer queue, which will lead to the growth of the
risk of packet discarding. When adopting a larger τ , the system allows each packet
to wait in the buffer queue for a longer time and thus fewer packets will be discarded.
A further careful observation is that different from the behaviors of the ROP, the
system can always achieve a better PDP performance under the i.i.d case than that
under the i.n.d case.
4.5.3.3 Q vs. Rs/Pup/τ
Fig. 4.4, Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.10 present how Rs, Pup and τ affect the system
performance in terms of the ST Q, respectively. It can be observed from Fig. 4.4
that as Rs increases to 2.1 and 2.4, the system ST under the i.n.d and i.i.d cases
first increases to its peak (i.e., 0.8061 and 0.9952) and then decreases monotonically,
respectively. This is because the ST is an integrated measure for the transmission
performance, and Rs has two side effects on ST. On the one hand, a larger Rs results
in more secrecy data per transmission; on the other hand, a larger Rs leads to a higher
SOP such that the transmission opportunities will be reduced. Fig. 4.7 shows that
as Pup increases Q first increases gradually and then decreases to 0. It is due to the
reason that a larger Pup will lead to more transmission opportunities for the relays,
and when Pup increases to a large value, more packets arrive at the destination, but
most of them are wiretapped by the eavesdropper. As can be seen from Fig. 4.10
that as τ increases the ST increases rapidly, and when τ = 16 and τ = 10, Q
reaches its maximal values (i.e., 0.246 and 0.2445) under the i.n.d and i.i.d cases,
respectively. This is because that when τ is relatively small, the delay constraint
mainly determines the transmission behaviors of nodes, but when τ is relatively large,
the security constraint (which is determined by Rs and Pup) will become dominant.
Moreover, we can observe that the system can always achieve a higher ST under the
i.i.d case than that under the i.n.d case.
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Figure 4.8: Reliable outage probability Pro vs. lifetime constraint τ .
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Figure 4.9: Packet discarding probability Pdis vs. lifetime constraint τ .
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Figure 4.10: Achievable secrecy throughput Q vs. lifetime constraint τ .
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Figure 4.11: Maximum achievable secrecy throughput Q vs. lifetime constraint τ
under optimal secrecy rate Rs.
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Figure 4.12: Minimum packet discarding probability Pdis vs. lifetime constraint τ
under optimal relay number M .
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Figure 4.13: Maximum achievable secrecy throughput Q vs. lifetime constraint τ
under optimal relay number M .
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4.5.4 Optimal Parameter Settings
We summarize in Fig. 4.11 the maximum ST that can be achieved by setting the
optimal secrecy rate Rs under the variation of lifetime constraint. It can be seen that
for a slack lifetime τ or SOP constraint Pup, we need to configure a larger Rs for
the transmitters to achieve the optimal ST. Another observation is that the maximal
achievable ST is a piecewise function of τ , and an optimal value of Rs can apply to
a small range of τ (e.g., for i.n.d case, when Pup = 0.01, the optimal secrecy rate
Rs = 1.2 can apply to τ = 2 and τ = 3). We can further observe from Fig. 4.11 that
as τ scales up, the maximal achievable ST becomes less sensitive to the variation of
τ . For example, under the i.n.d case with Pup = 0.1, when τ varies from 2 to 3, the
maximal ST increases from 0.3754 to 0.4595, while when τ varies from 9 to 10, the
maximal ST increases just from 0.7254 to 0.7405.
Taking into consideration that deploying too many relays will waste the system
resources, we further investigate the optimal setting for the number of relays under
some performance constraints. Fig. 4.12 presents the optimal setting of the number
of relays for minimizing the system PDP Pdis. We can observe from Fig. 4.12 that
when the system adopts a smaller Rs, we should deploy more relays to improve the
PDP performance. Furthermore, for a fixed Rs and Pup, the optimal number of relays
increases as the lifetime τ becomes large. Another interesting behavior is that the
optimal number of relays remains constant when the system adopts a small Rs and a
slack Pup. For example, when Rs = 0.5 and Pup = 0.1, the optimal number of relays
is always 12 no matter how the lifetime varies.
Finally, we examine in Fig. 4.13 the optimal setting of the number of relays for
maximizing the achievable ST Q with different packet lifetime. From Fig. 4.13, we
can see that for a given Rs, it needs to deploy more relays to improve the system ST
when a strict security performance is required. We can also note that when Pup = 0.1,
the optimal number of relays with Rs = 0.5 is bigger than that with Rs = 1.0, but
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when Pup = 0.01, the situation becomes reverse. A further careful observation of
Fig. 4.13 is that for a given Rs, the system first achieves a larger Q with Pup = 0.1
than that with Pup = 0.01, but when the lifetime constraint is relaxed to 6 time slots,
the system first achieves a larger Q with Pup = 0.01 than that with Pup = 0.1. This is
due to the reason that the system ST is an integrated measure for both the security
and relay transmission probability pmd, when τ is less than 6, the system ST is mainly
determined by pmd, but as τ increases, we can provide more relays to increase pmd
and the system ST is dominated by Pup.
4.6 Summary
This work focused on a buffer-aided relaying system with a limited packet lifetime.
To support secure and timely data delivery in the concerned system, we proposed a
novel communication protocol that grants transmission nodes different priorities for
packet delivery based on the combinative information of wireless channel state, real-
time buffer state, and packet delay. For the theoretical performance modeling, we
built a delicate CDT bitmap structure to track the packet number and delay informa-
tion in the buffer queues. After that, we applied the Markov chain theory to capture
the state transitions of the CDT bitmap, which enables to model the communication
QoS of the proposed communication protocol, i.e., ROP, PDP and achievable ST.
The results in this work shed new insights into the design and performance analysis




This final chapter summarizes our contributions and points out several topics for
future research.
5.1 Summary of Thesis
In this thesis, we studied the design of communication protocol to enhance the
PHY security for two-hop buffer-aided relaying systems, where the instantaneous
CSIs of eavesdropping channels are unavailable. We first designed the secure com-
munication protocols for two-hop buffer-aided relaying systems with/without the CSI
of the main channel at the transmitter. Then, we proposed the security/delay-aware
communication protocol for two-hop buffer-aided relaying systems with the statistic
CSIs of eavesdropping channels.
Chapter III investigated the secure communication in a two-hop cooperative wire-
less system, where a buffer-aided relay helps forward data from the source to des-
tination, and a passive eavesdropper attempts to intercept data transmission from
both the source and relay. Considering two communication scenarios, i.e., the in-
stantaneous channel state information is available or unavailable at the source node,
we designed two secure communication protocols without the CSIs of eavesdropping
channels, respectively, to ensure both the PHY security and communication QoS.
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In order to evaluate the system performance, we developed a general framework to
derive the expressions of E2E SOP, throughput and ST. Based on the theoretical
performance analysis, we further explored the performance optimization issues, re-
vealing the insightful tradeoffs between transmission security and QoS. An iterative
algorithm was developed to make sure that the proposed communication protocols
can flexibly configure the link selection parameters to satisfy various system perfor-
mance requirements. This work is very important and can serve as guidelines for the
design of communication protocol in future wireless cooperative networks.
Chapter IV investigated the secure communication in a wireless relaying system,
where the packet lifetime is limited, multiple buffer-aided relays help the source for-
ward packets to the destination, and a passive eavesdropper attempts to wiretap the
transmissions over both hops. We designed a novel security/delay-aware communica-
tion protocol to guarantee the end-to-end transmission security and timeliness. Based
on the wireless channel state, real-time buffer state, and packet delay requirement,
we grant the transmission nodes different priorities for packet delivery. In addition,
to create more transmission opportunities, one of the idle relays is opportunistically
selected as the jammer. For performance evaluation of the proposed protocol, we
first built a delicate CDT bitmap structure to track the packet number and delay
information in the buffer queues. After that, we then developed a Markov chain-
based theoretical framework to fully characterize the packet delivery process in two
hops. With the help of this framework, we further derived under two typical fading
channel cases the closed-form expressions for three fundamental system performance
metrics, namely reliable outage probability, packet discarding probability and achiev-
able secrecy throughput. This work can serve as guidelines for the design of secure
communication protocol in future delay-sensitive wireless networks. The established
framework can shed new insights into the performance analysis in terms of the infor-
mation discarding due to overdue for the two-hop cooperative communication system.
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5.2 Future Works
The potential research directions to extend this thesis are summarized as follows.
• Secure communication protocol for buffer-aided relaying systems with
data arrival. In this thesis, we mainly focus on the two-hop buffer-aided
relaying system where the data of the source is backlog. However, in the actual
network environment, the data of the source usually is received from other
transmitters. So, one meaningful and interesting work is to design a secure
communication protocol for buffer-aided relaying systems with data arrival.
It’s worth noting that, when selecting the transmission link or relay, the buffer
state of both source and relays must be considered to avoid the packet overflows
and empty transfers. Furthermore, the new communication protocol needs to
balance the transmission opportunity between the first hop and second hop
based on the arrival rate of the data. Besides, if the data timeliness is required,
the delivery delay must be redefined as the difference between the time that the
tagged data enters in the source queue and the time that the tagged data enters
the destination queue.
• Secure communication protocol with dynamic transmission power
and secrecy rate for buffer-aided relaying systems. In this thesis, we
mainly consider the fixed transmission powers and secrecy rate to facilitate pro-
tocol design and theoretical analysis. However, when the main channels have
low channel quality or the eavesdropping channels have high channel quality,
the fixed transmission power and secrecy rate would result in the fact that the
system has low-level information redundancy. Therefore, the system may waste
a lot of transmission opportunities. If the transmission power and security rate
can be adjusted dynamically, the system throughput and security throughput
will be increased. However, how to design the communication protocol with
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dynamic transmission power and secrecy rate is still an open problem, due to
the following reasons: 1) From the results in this thesis, we know that the
throughput and secrecy throughput reach the maximum only when the system
is in an equilibrium state, i.e., the probability of the relay receiving is equal
to the probability of its transmitting, which is determined by the communi-
cation protocol. However, the transmission power and secrecy rate determine
the communication protocol, and in turn, the communication protocol deter-
mines the dynamic adjustment of them. The coupling between them makes
the design of communication protocol hard; 2) Intuitively, high-level security,
throughput and secrecy throughput will result in higher power consumption.
Thus, for the sake of fairness, one new performance metric, i.e., secrecy energy
efficiency needs to be introduced, which increases the difficulty of the protocol
design. Therefore, a new and dedicated communication protocol is deserved on
dynamic transmission power and secrecy rate for secure communication, and
the study of this topic is of great importance for the secrecy of the buffer-aided
relaying systems.
• Secure communication protocol with non-orthogonal multiple access
(NOMA) for buffer-aided relaying systems. Available communication
protocols for secure two-hop buffer-aided relaying systems always select only one
relay for the data transmission, while making most of the relay nodes remain
idle during each transmission. The innovative concept of non-orthogonal multi-
ple access (NOMA) has been proposed to support more users than the number
of available orthogonal time-, frequency-, or code-domain resources. Thus, em-
bedding the NOMA technique into the design of communication protocol can
be capable of significantly reducing the transmission latency and increasing the
secrecy throughput. On the one hand, the NOMA technique allows multiple
relays to synchronously receive the data, which results in a lower waiting time
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of the data. On the other hand, it increases the amount of data that reaches
the relay per unit time slot, and according to the law of conservation of fluid,
the relay-destination link is allowed more transmission opportunities to facili-
tate the system to reach equilibrium. However, it is worth noting that: 1) the
interference among the relays will affect the selection of receiving relays and








Proofs in Chapter III
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Regarding the case of AR transmission mechanism, according to Algorithm 1,
the probability PA that Alice is selected to transmit message at a time slot can be
calculated as



























= µ(α, β). (A.1)
Regarding the case of FR transmission mechanism, the expression of PA changes
with the relationship between α and 2Ra − 1. According to Algorithm 2, when we set








= µ(α, β); when we set
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= ν(α, β), (A.2)
where fγ̄a,r(x) and fγ̄r,b(y) denote the probability density functions of γ̄a,r and γ̄r,b,
respectively.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 2











































From expressions (3.14) and (3.15) we have ∂µ̄
∂α
> 0 and ∂ν̄
∂α
> 0. Thus, for any given β
and Rs, as α increases, PA monotonically decreases while PR monotonically increases.
Assuming there is, if any, α∗ which makes P ∗A = P
∗
R for the given β and Rs, then
for α > α∗ we have PA(α) < P
∗
A and thus Φ(α) = PA(α) · Rs < Φ∗ = P ∗A · Rs; for
α < α∗ we have PA(α) < P
∗
A and thus Φ(α) = PA(α) ·Rs < Φ∗ = P ∗A ·Rs. It indicates
that for any given β and Rs, when Φ reaches its maximum, we have PA = PR.
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Similarly, by solving partial derivatives we can verify that for any given α and
Rs, as β increases, PA monotonically increases while PR monotonically decreases.
Through similar arguments we know that for any given α and Rs, when Φ reaches its
maximum, there is PA = PR.
Therefore, we can conclude that PA = PR is a necessary condition for the through-
put Φ reaching its maximum. Notice that PA = PR indicates the arrival rate equals
to the service rate for the Relay queue, in Queuing Theory, such a case is called at
the edge of non-absorbing state.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
According to [62, 63], d is the descent direction of Ψ(x(n)) if and only if dT∇Ψ(x(n)) <
0 at the point x(n). Furthermore, if dT∇gi(x(n)) < 0 holds at x(n), d is called the
strictly feasible direction. Therefore, in order to find a feasible descent direction at
x(n), we only need to find out d(n) and the minimum value of σ which satisfy the
constraints (3.43b)-(3.43d). | dj |≤ 1 is added to guarantee a finite optimal solution.





Proofs in Chapter IV
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
When no jammer is adopted in the given time slot n, Source s forwards the
confidential data to node m at the rate of channel capacity while being eavesdropped
by e. Then, the instantaneous secrecy rate [10] of system is given by














where Cs,m[n] and Cm,e[n] are the instantaneous channel capacity of transmission and
eavesdropping link, respectively. The SOP can be derived as


















Letting Pso ≤ Pup, we can obtain gs,m[n] ≥ 2−RsΩs,e lnPup. When relay k is selected















Similarly, the SOP of system can be derived as
















Letting Pso ≤ Pup, we can obtain gs,m[n] ≥ gk,m[n]Ξmsk. For the second hop, we can
obtain gm,d[n] ≥ gk,d[n]Ξdmk by the similar proof.
B.2 Proof of Theorem IV.1
Based on the proposed communication protocol, the concerned system is outage
only when all channel quality does not satisfy the condition (4.3) and (4.4). First,
we derive the probability that all m → d links are outage in state Si. Note that
only non-empty relays can be selected to transmit data, such that ΘDSIid = 1 when
GDSIi (d) = 0. When G
DSI
i (d) 6= 0, the probability that m→ d link is outage in state
Si is given by
ΘDSIid = P(gm,d < θm ∧ gm,d < min
k∈M/m
{gk,dΞdmk}) (B.6)
Then, by doing some numerical calculations and simplification on (B.6), we can obtain
the result (4.19). Since every oldest packet in each relay buffer has different delay
information d, d can be on behalf of each m→ d link. Therefore, the probability that
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Apparently GPNIil = 1 when G
PNI
i (l) = 0. Similarly, when G
PNI
i (l) 6= 0, we have
ΘPNIil = P(gs,m < θs ∧ gs,m < min
k∈M/m
{gk,mΞmsk}) (B.7)
Different from the above case, because different relays may own the same packet
number, the packet number l in the buffer of relay m cannot uniquely represent the
s → m link. Thus, for each l, we need to find out all s → m links which satisfy
ψ(U im) = l, i.e., ∀sm ∈ GPNIl . After some numerical calculations and simplification
on (B.7), we can obtain the result (4.24). Thus, the probability that all s→ m links















B.3 Proof of Theorem IV.2
According to Algorithm 5, the relay is given higher priority than source on packet
transmission due to lifetime constraint. Therefore, source can be selected to transmit
packet only when all m→ d links are outage, and there would be four cases.
Case 1: The selected relay is m∗ and the packet number in its buffer is 0, i.e.,
D = m∗∧l∗ = 0. The elements of GPNIl∗ are divided into two categories, one belongs to
the subset Gsm∗l∗ (i.e., sm ∈ Gsm
∗
l∗ ) whose channel quality satisfies the condition (4.3),
the other one belongs to the subset Gsm∗l∗ but not to the set GPNIl∗ (i.e., sm̂ /∈ Gsm
∗
l∗
and sm̂ ∈ GPNIl∗ ), and theirs channel quality dose not satisfy the condition (4.3).
Note that for different sets of Gsm∗l∗ , the probabilities that s → m∗ link is selected
for transmission leading to the state transition from Si to Sj have different values.
Therefore, we need to find out all possible subsets of GPNIl∗ that each contains the link
s→ m∗. Overall, when D = m∗∧ l∗ = 0, the probability that the source transmission
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where the term 1/|Gsm∗l∗ | is due to the fact that we select one of them uniformly when




id is the probability that all m → d
links are outage.
Case 2: The selected relay is m∗ and the packet number in its buffer is 0 < l∗ <
τ−1, i.e., D = m∗∧0 < l∗ < τ−1. Based on Algorithm 1, the fewer packets the relay
owns, the higher priority it is selected as the receiver. Thus, only when the quality of
these s→ m links does not satisfy the condition (4.3) where the involved relays own
fewer packets than m∗, i.e., ψ(U im) ∈ [0, l∗− 1]. Thus, when D = m∗∧ 0 < l∗ < τ − 1,
























Case 3: The selected partner pair is (m∗, k) and the packet number in its buffer
is l∗ = 0, i.e., D = (m∗, k) ∧ l∗ = 0. Notice that we would select one idle relay as
the cooperative jammer only when the quality of all s → m links does not satisfy
the condition (4.3). So, when the relays m∗ and k are selected as the partner pair,
there have three-level meanings: 1) the channel gains of these s → m links where
the involved relays have the non-empty buffers, i.e., ψ(U im) ≥ 1, must satisfy the
condition θs > gs,m; 2) the channel gains of s → m∗ and m∗ → k links must satisfy
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the condition θs > g
s,m∗ ≥ gk,m∗Ξm
∗
sk and gk,m∗βm∗ ≤ minm 6=m∗,k{gm,m∗βm∗}; 3) for
other relays which own the empty buffer, i.e., m̄ ∈ GPNIl∗ ∧m̄ 6= m∗, we have θs > gs,m̄
and gk,m∗βm∗ < minm̂6=m̄{gm̂,m̄βm̄}. Thus, when D = (m∗, k)∧ l∗ = 0, the probability






























Case 4: The selected partner pair is (m∗, k) and the packet number in its buffer
is 0 < l∗ < τ − 1, i.e., D = (m∗, k)∧ 0 < l∗ < τ − 1. The difference between this case
and Case 3 is that all s→ m links are outage where the number of the packets in the
buffer of the involved relay m is less than l∗. Similar to the Case 3, the probability
































Overall, the state transition caused by the source transmission from state Si to
state Sj under the proposed communication protocol only have the above four cases.
Therefore, by some numerical calculations and simplification on the formulas (B.8)-
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